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INTRODUCTION
“To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.”—
Justice Robert Jackson1
Sports are an essential part of American society. For example, baseball
often is referred to as America’s pastime.2 Every summer, ballparks across
the nation are filled with energetic fans of all ages cheering for their
favorite team. Many of our childhood memories encompass little league
games, high school sporting events, and watch parties for the Super Bowl
and the World Cup. Our childhood idols often are sports legends, such as
Hank Aaron, Babe Ruth, and Muhammad Ali. Many Americans view
sports as a venue to teach cherished values, such as teamwork, dedication,
and work ethic.
Despite the multitude of sports available to play and watch, football is
arguably one of the most popular and lucrative sports in the world. The
National Football League (“NFL”) reached $14 billion in revenue in 2016
alone.3 High school football programs are an integral part of the NFL
landscape because they serve as a training ground and pipeline for children
with aspirations of playing in the NFL.4 As a result, high school studentathletes often mimic the very players they seek to become. Students wear
their favorite player’s jersey, team colors, and other types of paraphernalia.
But what happens when students mimic their sports idol’s social protests
during sporting events? What happens when social activism enters the
world of youth sports? High school players across the nation illuminated
this issue when they began to mimic a NFL player, Colin Kaepernick, and
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
2. Micah Chen, America’s Pastime: 20 Reasons Baseball Will Always Hail
Over Football, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 25, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com
/articles/676720-americas-pastime-20-reasons-why-baseball-will-always-hail-over
-football [https://perma.cc/ZYM3-TJMW].
3. Daniel Kaplan, NFL revenue reaches $14B, fueled by media, SPORTS
BUSINESS DAILY J., Mar. 6, 2017, at 4.
4. See, e.g., Edwin Weathersby, NFL Pipeline: Long Beach Poly Second
Among High Schools for Most Active NFL Players, FOX SPORTS WEST (Sept. 5,
2017, 5:59 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/west/story/nfl-pipeline-long-beachpoly-second-among-high-schools-for-most-active-nfl-players-091517
[https://perma.cc/D6W4-JW7J]; Julian Sonny, The 10 High Schools That Produce
The Most NFL Players in America , E L ITE D AILY (May 27, 2014),
https://www.elitedaily.com/sports/10-high-schools-produce-nfl-players-america
/608500 [https://perma.cc/7M6G-WS4L].
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his teammate’s act of kneeling during the national anthem in protest of
police brutality against African-American males.5 Although the First
Amendment protects Kaepernick’s symbolic act, many high school players
across the nation did not receive the same constitutional protection for
mimicking his national anthem protest.6 On the contrary, school leaders
usurped the young athletes’ constitutional rights by disciplining student
protesters through school and game suspensions.7 First Amendment
jurisprudence clearly provides students in K-12 public schools with freedom
of expression rights as long as such acts do not create a material disruption to
the school learning environment.8 Under the Material Disruption Standard,
school administrators are not permitted to limit a student’s First Amendment
rights unless the expression causes a substantial disruption to the school
learning environment or interferes with the rights of others.9 Courts defer to

5. Bob Cooke, High School Athletes Join Colin Kaepernick In Anthem
Protests; Angry PA Announcers Don’t, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2016, 10:05 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2016/09/11/high-school-athletes-join-colinkaepernick-in-anthem-protest-angry-pa-announcers-dont/#65179ea77ea1 [https://per
ma.cc/7STT-U5QQ].
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”); Knowles Adkisson, In Louisiana High School Players Link
Arms, But Do Not Kneel During the Anthem, W ASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-louisiana-high-school-players-linkarms-but-do-not-kneel-during-anthem/2017/09/29/9f893f40-a564-11e7-ade1-76d0
61d56efa_story.html?utm_term=.91ae8c2b378e
[https://perma.cc/9NLD-NSY6].
This Article highlights the controversy surrounding high school athletes being
disciplined for kneeling during the national anthem. A Louisiana principal issued a
letter to students threatening to suspend any student from the game or team that knelt
during the national anthem. The American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana issued
a statement expressing that the principal’s national anthem policy violated a 1943
Supreme Court case, West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which held that
public schools may not coerce students to stand during patriotic rituals. This Article
highlights the growing debate regarding Kaepernick being afforded his constitutional
right to engage in symbolic protests during the national anthem while high school
students are being denied those same rights. See infra Part I.A.–B.
7. Christine Hauser, High Schools Threaten to Punish Students Who Kneel
During the National Anthem, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/09/29/us/high-school-anthem-protest.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc
/C9SJ-J9N6].
8. Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still
Standing, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2009); see also Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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school administrators’ discretion in determining whether a student’s conduct
has caused a material disruption to the school learning environment.10
This Article examines the intersection of high school sports, social
protest, and the law. Although the majority of public discourse has centered
on professional sports,11 it is imperative also to consider the impact of national
anthem protests on high school athletics—especially in light of the
“Kaepernick Effect.” The Kaepernick Effect refers to the wave of studentathletes who, during school athletic events, are mimicking NFL player Colin
Kaepernick’s act of kneeling during the national anthem in protest of the
treatment of black Americans and people of color.12 The students, like
Kaepernick, are attempting to utilize sporting events as a platform for social
activism.13 Because high schools are an essential part of the pipeline to
professional sports, the appropriateness of social activism in the school
context is a crucial part of this national debate.14 This Article argues that
student-athletes have the constitutional right under the First Amendment to
engage in protests during patriotic rituals, such as the national anthem. Thus,
any subsequent discipline is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has stated
that “[t]he vigilant protection of First Amendment freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in our nation’s public schools” because public schools serve as a
training ground for our nation’s future leaders and promote the preservation
of our democracy.15 Overzealous school administrators cannot be allowed to
infringe on students’ First Amendment freedoms under the guise of school
discipline. It is vital to our democracy that public schools promote a
marketplace of ideas by encouraging students to express their diverse
perspectives openly as opposed to proselytizing them to ascribe to a particular
orthodoxy.16 Although national anthem protests performed by students could
cause a material disruption to school sporting events because of opposition
from spectators, the preservation of First Amendment rights should supersede
any limitations on those rights which are enforced to avoid discomfort or
thwart the dissemination of unpopular views.
10. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA.
L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2008).
11. See infra notes 34, 37–38 and accompanying text.
12. See discussion infra Part I.A.
13. See discussion infra Part I.B.
14. Jamilah King, Why high school players protesting the national anthem is
great patriotism, MIC (Sept. 16, 2016, 9:43 PM), https://mic.com/articles/154333
/why-high-school-players-protesting-the-national-anthem-is-great-patriotism#.iu
Y5Tzpfj [https://perma.cc/U8UZ-GZJ2]; see also supra note 4.
15. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
16. The Brave New World of Fear: Public Education, 15 LEGAL NOTES
EDUC. 1 (2003).
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The existing Tinker Material Disruption Standard,17 which has served as
the guiding principle for determining whether a school official may limit
symbolic speech rights for students in K-12 schools, should be interpreted
differently to better protect students’ free speech rights when the conduct in
question occurs outside of the school learning environment. Under the current
Tinker standard, school authorities may limit First Amendment freedom of
expression if the symbolic speech causes a material disruption to the school
learning environment or interferes with the rights of others.18 This criterion is
highly subjective because a material disruption to one school administrator
may not be classified as such by another. As a result, the application of the
Tinker Standard in relation to national anthem protests during K-12 sporting
events has been inconsistent, leaving students’ free speech rights to the whims
of capricious school administrators.19 Furthermore, the Tinker Material
Disruption Standard should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to symbolic
speech that occurs within the school learning environment. The current
interpretation of the Tinker standard is antithetical to the spirit and purpose of
17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
In Tinker, the Court emphasized that students do not shed their constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse door. Under the Tinker standard, schools may not limit
students’ First Amendment freedom of expression rights unless: (1) the
expression causes a substantial disruption to the school learning environment; and
(2) interferes with the rights of others. Id.
18. Id.
19. Evie Blad, Can schools punish students for protesting the national
anthem?, PBS (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/schoolsstudents-protesting-national-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/RK7G-6XCT]. Whether
students who choose to kneel during the national anthem are disciplined largely
depends on whether the school administrator approves of the symbolic conduct,
with little consideration for the students’ First Amendment rights. For example,
students attending Parkway High School in Louisiana who choose to kneel during
the national anthem will be punished by being removed from the team, whereas
students attending Centerville High School in Ohio are permitted to kneel during
the national anthem without fear of disciplinary action. The principal of
Centerville High stated, “I personally am disheartening [sic] when people [kneel
during the national anthem] but that’s because I choose to stand so that people
have the right to freedom of expression and if they choose to kneel then that’s
what I’m standing for.” Dana Smith, High school on students kneeling during
national anthem, WDTN (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:15 PM), http://wdtn.com/2017/09/29
/high-school-on-students-kneeling-during-national-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/4P
9Z-KVA7]; see also Jacob Bogage, Louisiana high school will kick students off
team if they don’t stand for national anthem, W ASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/09/28/louisiana-highschool-will-kick-students-off-team-if-they-dont-stand-for-national-anthem/?utm
_term=.5c2e87159f4a [https://perma.cc/NC9J-NLYR].
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the First Amendment and leaves students’ constitutional freedoms to the
abuse of discretionary power by school authorities.
This national anthem controversy is representative of the vicissitudes of
political controversy that have inundated the K-12 landscape as school
authorities struggle to strike a balance between patriotism and constitutional
freedoms. Students’ symbolic speech rights in K-12 public schools—both
inside and outside of the classroom setting—must be clarified. This Article
proposes a new K-12 standard that applies the full protections of the Spence
Test20 for student-initiated symbolic speech with the Material Disruption
Standard from Tinker v. Des Moines.21 Currently, the Spence criteria is used
primarily in the context of adult freedom of expression cases and the Tinker
Standard is applied exclusively to the K-12 schooling context.22 Because the
Spence standard is used to ensure that adults like Kaepernick receive the full
protections of the constitution, we should extend the same level of protection
to students in K-12 schools to safeguard their freedom of expression rights.23
20. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974).
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
22. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1989) (citing Spence,
418 U.S. 405 in the context of freedom of expression of an adult violating an antiflag desecration statute); Laura Prieston, Note, Parents, Students, and the Pledge
of Allegiance: Why Courts Must Protect the Marketplace of Student Ideas, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 375, 383 (2011) (“At present, the holding of Tinker has not been overruled
and still protects the First Amendment free speech rights of students in public
schools.”).
23. The Tinker Material Disruption Standard is too narrow and thus fails to
safeguard students’ free speech rights. The Spence Test, however, promotes
expansive free speech rights but fails to consider the “special characteristics” of
schools in assessing First Amendment rights. If students truly do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door, then the theoretical gap between
Tinker and Spence must be addressed by the adoption of my proposed new
constitutional theory, the Tinker-Spence standard. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”); Jonathan Pyle, Comment, Speech in Public Schools: Different Context
or Different Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 586, 590 (2002) (“When considering
the constitutionality of a school speech regulation, one need only ask, ‘As a matter
of constitutional law, would the expression be protected if it was made by an adult
in an analogous situation?’ If the answer is yes, then ask, ‘Is the school context
different in relevant ways so that the same protections ought not apply?’ This
approach respects students as constitutional persons, promotes the value of
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In Spence v. Washington, the Court held that symbolic speech qualifies
for First Amendment protection if: (1) the actor/speaker intends to convey a
particular message; and (2) it is likely that those who witness the activity will
understand what the speaker intends to convey by his or her behavior.24 Lower
courts have adapted this two-part criteria, known as the Spence Test, to
ascertain whether expressive conduct qualifies as symbolic speech.25
Concomitantly, the Tinker Material Disruption Standard permits school
authorities to infringe on students’ freedom of expression rights if the
symbolic speech causes a material disruption to the school learning
environment or infringes on the rights of others.26 The proposed new
constitutional standard, the Tinker-Spence Test, combines aspects of the
Spence Test and Tinker Material Disruption Standard to safeguard students’
freedom of expression rights while still considering the special characteristics
of K-12 schools.27 Under the proposed Tinker-Spence Test, symbolic speech
in K-12 public schools is protected if:
consistency, employs a broad base of legal precedent, and leads to relatively
consistent results. Lower courts follow this approach in some areas of student
rights, but not in others . . . .”).
24. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
25. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to
Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (“The appealing functionality of Spence’s
test has made it the more common approach used by the lower courts to identify
whether expressive conduct will be treated as symbolic speech.”).
26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
27. Several landmark Supreme Court cases that address free speech rights in
K-12 schools consider the “special characteristics of schools” when determining
the deference afforded to school administrators to limits students’ First
Amendment rights. Although the Court does not define explicitly the “special
characteristics” referenced, one can infer that the Court is referring to the
attendees, which consists of minors who collectively may be considered a
vulnerable population. See generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5
(1981) (discussing that the Court’s inquiry is shaped by the educational context
in which it arises). The Court stated, “First Amendment rights must be analyzed
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Id.; Bd. of Educ.,
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 853 (1982)
(“While students’ First Amendment rights must be construed ‘in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment,’ ibid., the special characteristics
of the school library make that environment especially appropriate for the
recognition of such rights.”); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (“First Amendment rights,
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are
available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost
50 years.”).
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(1) The actor/speaker intends to convey a particular message;
(2) Those who witness the activity likely understand what the speaker
intends to convey by his or her behavior;
(3) Symbolic speech does not interfere with the rights of others; and
(4) Symbolic speech does not involve peer coercion of other students
to participate.
This Article offers a prospective path toward safeguarding students’ First
Amendment free speech rights in K-12 schools by bridging the doctrinal gap
between Tinker and Spence through the adoption of the Tinker-Spence
Standard. In doing so, this Article seeks to make an important contribution to
constitutional scholarship by clarifying and better safeguarding students’
freedom of expression rights in K-12 schools.
Part I discusses Colin Kaepernick’s contentious national anthem protest
and the controversy that followed, as high school students began to mimic his
social activism. Part I also highlights the intersection of social activism and
sports and the implications of this relationship for public school students. Part
II provides an overview of free speech jurisprudence in K-12 schools. Part III
critiques the inadequacy of current law and proposes the adoption of a new
constitutional standard, the Tinker-Spence Test, to K-12 school environments
to govern students’ symbolic speech rights. This Article concludes with a brief
discussion of the importance of promoting civic education through the
preservation of student freedom of expression rights.
I. SOCIAL ACTIVISM ENTERS THE WORLD OF HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS:
THE COLIN KAEPERNICK EFFECT
Historically, social activism and social movements have been used as a
catalyst for social, cultural, and political change.28 Social movements are
premised on the belief that a group of individuals with similar values on a
particular issue can change the status quo through action and advocacy.29
Some displays of social activism are more controversial than others.30 For
example, Breanna Stewart, a member of the Seattle Storm Women’s National
Basketball Association (“WNBA”) team, engaged in social activism by
wearing a t-shirt to the Nickelodeon Kids Choice Sports Awards with the
words “Wild Feminist” printed on the front to help bring attention to gender
28. Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s Power to
Transform Law, 105 KY. L.J. 413, 420 (2017).
29. Id. at 421.
30. Mitchell Nemeth, Using Sports As a Platform for Social Activism,
MERION WEST (Oct. 21, 2017), http://merionwest.com/2017/10/21/using-sportsas-a-platform-for-social-activism/ [https://perma.cc/3WL3-8UN9].
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equality.31 Stewart’s act was met with little to no opposition.32 Other acts of
social activism, however, such as Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling during the
national anthem, have created a world of controversy by igniting passionate
conversations on the relationship between free speech rights and social
activism in sports.33 This section discusses the growing influence of social
activism in sports, with a particular emphasis on professional and high school
football.
A. The Rebirth of Social Activism in Sports: The Evolution of the Kaepernick
Effect
On August 26, 2016, Colin Kaepernick, a quarterback for the San
Francisco 49ers, added his name to a growing list of NFL players and athletes
using their names and platforms to bring publicity to an issue they want to
bring to the forefront of public discourse.34 Colin Kaepernick’s social protest
is not a new phenomenon; in fact, some of this nation’s most iconic moments
of social activism have occurred during sporting events by professional
athletes. Some of the most well-known instances of professional athletes
engaging in social activism include the following events: Muhammad Ali’s

31. Lindsay Kramer, Breanna Stewart finding an activist voice as loud as her
game: ‘Why are you not speaking up?’, SYRACUSE, http://www.syracuse.com
/sports/index.ssf/2017/07/breanna_stewart_finding_an_activist_voice_thats_as_
loud_as_her_game.html (last updated July 18, 2017, 2:27 PM) [https://perma.cc
/6EH5-FVY6].
32. Id.
33. Lucy Rock, As Women’s Sports Grows, Athletes Find They Can’t Stay Silent
In the Era of Trump, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardi
an.com/sport/2017/jul/29/womens-sport-activism-and-political-protest-planned-parent
hood [https://perma.cc/A7V5-J7Q5]; see also discussion infra Part I.A.; Timothy L.
Epstein, The Relationship Between Sports and Social Activism, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL.,
Jan. 6, 2015, at 1.
34. The number of professional athletes kneeling during the national anthem
continues to grow since Colin Kaepernick’s historic protest. For example, the
following professional athletes have engaged in national anthem protests: San
Francisco 49ers linebacker Eli Harold, WNBA player Kelsey Bone, soccer player
Megan Rapinoe, Denver Broncos linebacker Brandon Marshall, and Miami
Dolphins players Arian Foster, Michael Thomas, Kenny Stills, and Jelani Jenkins.
Lindsay Gibbs & Aysha Khan, Tracking the Kaepernick Effect: The Anthem
Protests are Spreading, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:15 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/national-anthem-sports-protest-tracker-kaepernick-284f
f1d1ab3e/ [https://perma.cc/TN4R-LD4F].
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refusal to be drafted during the Vietnam War;35 the “Black Power salute”
during the 1968 Olympics by medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos;36
and, more recently, Colin Kaepernick’s refusal to stand during the national
anthem.37
The Kaepernick phenomenon has permeated other NFL teams as well as
other professional sports. For example, Kenny Stills of the Miami Dolphins
and Marcus Peters of the Kansas City Chiefs also participated in national
anthem protests during NFL games.38 Likewise, United States soccer player
Megan Rapinoe kneeled during the national anthem to protest racial injustice
35. In 1967, boxing champion Muhammad Ali refused to be drafted to fight
in the Vietnam War, citing religious reasons for his decision. As a result, he was
stripped of his heavyweight boxing title, convicted of draft evasion, and sentenced
to five years in prison. Ali appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing
that he qualified for conscientious objector status because his refusal to enter the
draft was based on his Muslim faith. Muhammad Ali’s conviction eventually was
overturned by the Supreme Court on a technicality. See Clay v. United States, 403
U.S. 698 (1971); see also Krishnadev Calamur, Muhammad Ali and Vietnam,
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06
/muhammad-ali-vietnam/485717/ [https://perma.cc/4K67-6MZP].
36. Tommie Smith and John Carlos sparked world controversy when they
gave the Black Power salute as they stood on the awards podium at the 1968
Olympics in Mexico City. Their symbolic act was in protest of the inequality in
the United States for black Americans. The backlash for their social activism was
swift and severe. Both men were suspended from the United States Olympic team,
vilified by their communities, and received countless death threats. See Joshua
Haddow, We Interviewed Tommie Smith About the 1968 ‘Black Power’ Salute,
VICE (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ex5mz7/the-storybehind-the-1968-salute.team [https://perma.cc/KLU9-8BCX].
37. See Mahita Gajanan, Colin Kaepernick and a Brief History of Protest in
Sports, TIME: SPORTS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://time.com/4470998/athletes-protestcolin-kaepernick/ [https://perma.cc/D2VG-VJXH]. Significantly, a professional
athlete’s decision not to stand during the national anthem is not entirely new. In
1996, the NBA almost suspended Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf for his decision not to
stand during the national anthem because it conflicted with his Islamic belief
system. Abdul-Rauf’s stance ultimately led to his early departure from the NBA.
See Eddie Maisonet, Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf: Here, gone and quickly forgotten,
SBNATION (Mar. 25, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/3/25/5544
920/mahmoud-abdul-rauf-nuggets-national-anthem [https://perma.cc/T65D-2ESM].
38. NFL players who protested during the national anthem in Week 11 2016,
ESPN (Nov. 20, 2016), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/221815 /nflplayers-who-protested-during-the-national-anthem-in-week-11 [https://perma.cc/3
ZYY-6THB]. Both NFL players, Kenny Stills of the Miami Dolphins and Marcus
Peters of the Kansas City Chiefs, kneeled during the national anthem to protest
police brutality. Id.
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in the United States in support of Kaepernick’s stance.39 In a post-game
interview following the protest, Rapinoe stated, “I am disgusted with the way
he has been treated . . . and [the] hatred he has received in all of this . . . . We
need a more substantive conversation around race relations and the way people
of color are treated.”40 Notably, the WNBA, after intense criticism, reversed its
decision to fine athletes for wearing shirts with “#BlackLivesMatter” and
“#Dallas5” hashtags41 printed on the front.42 Additionally, Barbara Barker of
Newsday wrote,
Although much of the recent activism has centered around Black
Lives Matter, there has been a growing political awareness for several
years with athletes using their platform to try to effect social change.
Jason Collins became the first active athlete in one of the four major
U.S. professional sports leagues to come out as gay, a number of
athletes have spoken out about LGBT rights, Aaron Rodgers took on
39. U.S. soccer star Megan Rapinoe kneels during national anthem, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2016, 10:48 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-soccer-star
-megan-rapinoe-kneels-during-national-anthem-colin-kaepernick/ (“‘It was a little
nod to Kaepernick and everything that he’s standing for right now. I think it’s actually
pretty disgusting the way he was treated and the way that a lot of the media has
covered it and made it about something that it absolutely isn’t. We need to have a
more thoughtful, two-sided conversation about racial issues in this country.’”)
[https://perma.cc/SPL3-KMRC].
40. Soccer player Megan Rapinoe kneels as ‘nod to Kaepernick’, ESPN (Sept.
7, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/17467341/nwsl-seattle-reign-uswomen-national-team-player-megan-rapinoe-national-anthem-kneel-nod-san-francis
co-49ers-quarterback-colin-kaepernick [https://perma.cc/KK44-WN2T].
41. Black Lives Matter is a social activist movement whose mission is to
build local coalitions to address violence against black communities by addressing
things such as police brutality. See About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://black
livesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/23GP
-9EPH]. The Dallas 5 is a reference used to acknowledge and honor the five fallen
Dallas police officers that were ambushed during a peaceful demonstration
regarding recent police shootings involving black civilians in the city of Dallas.
See Powerful Mural Honors Slain Dallas Police Officers, FOX NEWS INSIDER
(Aug. 1, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://insider.foxnews.com/2016/08/01/mural-honorsslain-dallas-police-officers-see-powerful-photos [https://perma.cc/BT2V-W7UN].
Notably, hashtags are labels used on social media sites like Twitter or Facebook
to represent content on a particular topic. Individuals often use hashtags on social
media sites to signal that they are sharing relevant information on a particular
topic, such as poverty or unemployment.
42. Alicia Adamczyk, The WNBA Reverses Fine for Black Lives Matter
Warm Up Shirts, MONEY: SPORTS (July 25, 2016, 1:54 PM), http://time.com
/money/4417237/wnba-black-lives-matter-fine/ [https://perma.cc/B532-SXKU].
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a fan who shouted an anti-Muslim remark and Ed O’Bannon sued the
NCAA on behalf of college athletes.43
Notably, following Kaepernick’s act of kneeling during the national
anthem, other players have engaged in other acts of symbolic protests, such
as sitting, holding up raised fists, and locking arms.44 Although
Kaepernick’s protest during a NFL game is one example in a long history
of social activism in sports, the nature of his protest—kneeling during the
national anthem—is arguably one of the most controversial acts in the
history of professional sports.45 Kaepernick’s act provoked a national debate
about the appropriateness of social protests in professional sports.46
Professional athletes engaging in social protests have been categorized as
“disrespectful” or “unpatriotic” by some fans while others applaud them for
using their names and platforms to bring publicity to important social
issues.47 The heart of the debate, however, has centered around patriotic
symbolism and the sentiment that all Americans should stand during the
national anthem to honor the men and women of the armed forces.48
Therefore, many viewed Kaepernick’s symbolic act of kneeling during the
national anthem as unpatriotic and disrespectful to the men and women of
43. Barbara Barker, Athletes no longer afraid to speak out on social issues,
NEWSDAY: SPORTS (July 15, 2016, 8:35 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/colum
nists/barbara-barker/athletes-no-longer-afraid-to-speak-out-on-social-issues-1.12050
846 [https://perma.cc/8HEY-BYS4].
44. Sophie Tatum, Athletes, activists spar on kneeling National Anthem protests,
CNN (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/27/politics /cnn-nflkneeling-protests-town-hall-ac360/index.html [https://perma.cc/E65N-JVDG].
45. Colin Kaepernick’s symbolic act of kneeling during the national anthem
in protest of police brutality is distinct from other historical incidences of social
activism in sports because Kaepernick’s act sparked a movement within American
sports. Specifically, Kaepernick’s protest inspired athletes from all types of sports
and levels—high school and collegiate sports, for example—to join his efforts to
bring attention to police brutality. Significantly, one of Colin Kaepernick’s San
Francisco 49ers teammates, safety Eric Reid, expressed support for Kaepernick
by joining him in taking a knee during the first kneeling protest. See Mark
Sandritter, A timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s national anthem protest and the
athletes who joined him, SBNATION (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.sbnation.com
/2016/9/11/12869726/colin-kaepernick-national-anthem-protest-seahawks-brandonmarshall-nfl [https://perma.cc/XA5B-J2HR].
46. Tatum, supra note 44.
47. Jennifer Angiesta, CNN Poll: Americans Split on Anthem Protests, CNN
POLITICS (Sept. 30, 2017, 2:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/politics
/national-anthem-nfl-cnn-poll/index.html [https://perma.cc/9J4J-X264].
48. Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 367, 368–69 (2004).
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the armed forces who risk their lives to keep the United States safe.49
Members of the military and ordinary citizens vehemently expressed their
disapproval of Kaepernick’s act.50 Opponents of Kaepernick’s actions also
contended that social protests should not be a part of the sporting milieu
and argue that spectators should be able to watch their favorite team play
without being subjected to political and social controversy.51 Conversely,
those who championed Kaepernick’s protest argued that he simply was
exercising his constitutional right to freedom of expression by using his
public persona to bring attention to police brutality against black
Americans—an important social issue.52
Despite the criticism, these athletes are lawfully exercising their First
Amendment freedom of expression rights. While people across the nation
debated the appropriateness of Kaepernick’s protest, a silent movement
was slowly building in high school football. High school students across
the nation began to mimic Kaepernick’s example by kneeling at football
games during the national anthem in protest of police brutality.53

49. Katie Couric, Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Trump, Kaepernick and her lifelong
love of the law, YAHOO (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/katiecouric/ruthbader-ginsburg-on-trump-kaepernick-and-her-lifelong-love-of-the-law-132236633
.html [https://perma.cc/4HZJ-YCRD]; see also Ryan Wilson, Esiason on Kaepernick
sitting: ‘It’s about as disrespectful as any athlete has ever been,’ CBSSPORTS (Aug.
31, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/esiason-on-kaepernick-sitting-itsabout-as-disrespectful-as-any-athlete-has-ever-been/ [https://perma.cc/NS2W-C
3DR].
50. Paul Szoldra & Christopher Woody, What Some US Troops Really Think
About Colin Kaepernick And Kneeling During the National Anthem, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2017), http://taskandpurpose.com/troops-kaepernick-nationalanthem-trump/ [https://perma.cc/8KKW-2BC8].
51. John O. McGinnis, Social Norms, Not the Constitution, Should Regulate
Protests at Sport Ceremonies, LIBRARY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (Sept. 18, 2016),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/09/18/social-norms-not-the-constitution-shouldregulate-protests-at-sport-ceremonies/ [https://perma.cc/BGJ3 -5TD5].
52. Athena Jones & Tom LoBianco, Obama: Colin Kaepernick ‘exercising
constitutional right’, CNN (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/05
/politics/barack-obama-colin-kaepernick/ [https://perma.cc/8K2P-QBWY]; see
also Chris Biderman, Colin Kaepernick is exercising his rights, whether you agree
or not, NINERS WIRE (Aug. 27, 2016), http://ninerswire.usatoday.com/2016/08/27
/colin-kaepernick-is-exercising-his-rights-whether-your-agree-or-not/ [https://perma
.cc/M7UL-2YW3].
53. Student Protests During National Anthem & Pledge: A Resource &
Timeline, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP, http://ncac.org/students-protesting
-during-anthem-pledge-a-resource-timeline (last visited October 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/CE3T-SLA7].
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B. The Emergence of Social Protests in High School Sports and
Disciplinary Consequences
As news of Colin Kaepernick’s protest began to move across the
country, it was only a matter of time before student-athletes attending K12 schools followed suit. Many school administrators found themselves
thrust into a world of controversy as their respective communities reacted
to the student-athletes’ social protests during school sporting events.54
Specifically, school authorities struggled to determine the correct response
to students’ symbolic expression during the national anthem.55 School
authorities either could discipline students for engaging in a national
anthem protest or support students’ conduct as an exercise of their
constitutional freedom of expression rights. Either course of action placed
school administrators at risk of public backlash and criticism from the
communities in which they serve.
School authorities expressed various reactions to student national
anthem protests. Some school administrators expressed public support for
students while others issued sanctions or swiftly implemented policies
prohibiting national anthem protests during school sporting events. For
example, the Oakland School District in California retweeted news stories
and supportive messages on the district’s official Twitter page in
acknowledgement of students’ rights to engage in social activism during
school-sponsored sporting events.56 Additionally, coaches, parents, and
teachers throughout the country joined student protests during the national
54. Eric Russell, High school athletes, officials confront national anthem
protests, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com
/2017/09/26/high-school-athletes-and-officials-confront-national-anthem-protests/
(“High school athletes, coaches and administrators across Maine are grappling
with the increasingly bitter debate over whether kneeling during the national
anthem is an acceptable form of protest.”) [https://perma.cc/7BKX-96CG]; see
also Kyle Neddenriep, Some Indiana High Schools Weigh Pregame Protest
Phenomenon, INDY STAR, https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/high-school/2017
/09/28/some-indiana-high-schools-weigh-pregame-protest-phenomenon/712907001/
(last updated Sept. 28, 2017, 5:01 PM) (“[T]his is as polarizing of an issue as he has
seen in his time as an administrator. ‘I’m afraid of what could happen, . . . . What
happens if adults in the bleachers get mad? You’ve got a bad situation on your
hands. It’s an emotional topic.’”) [https://perma.cc/KAF6-GV2M].
55. See Blad, supra note 19. School administrators had different
interpretations regarding whether students kneeling during the national anthem
was protected speech or unprotected speech that warranted disciplinary action. As
a result, some students were disciplined for kneeling during the national anthem
while others were permitted to engage in the symbolic conduct. See id.
56. Id.
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anthem.57 For example, in Seattle, the entire high school football team at
Garfield High School, including the coaches, kneeled during the national
anthem in protest of social injustice.58 The Seattle Public School System
responded to the players’ protest in a public statement that declared that
“[s]tudents kneeling during the national anthem are expressing their rights
protected by the First Amendment. Seattle Public Schools supports all
students’ right to free speech.”59 Similarly, the entire football team from
Woodrow Wilson High School in New Jersey, including their coaches,
protested during the national anthem to display their solidarity with Colin
Kaepernick and his efforts to increase awareness about police brutality.60
As the trend of national anthem protests continues to permeate the
high school sports milieu, some school administrators are supporting
students’ symbolic expression while others are resistant and respond with
swift, harsh punishments, characterizing the student protests as defiant and
disrespectful.61 As a result, the punitive responses to student national
anthem protests range in severity and scope. For example, Mike Oppong,
a football player at Doherty High School in Massachusetts, received a onegame suspension for kneeling during the national anthem in solidarity with
Colin Kaepernick to protest police brutality against people of color.62
Similarly, another student, Bishop Gorman, was suspended from his
Nevada high school and placed on a disciplinary contract for kneeling
during the national anthem.63 Although these two instances of disciplinary
action occurred on opposite sides of the country, they both represent the
disturbing trend of impermissible content regulation of student speech by
state officials.64 Unfortunately, the harsh responses to individuals
57. Id.
58. Q13 Fox News Staff, Entire Seattle high school football team kneels during
national anthem before game, Q13 F OX (Sept. 16, 2016, 10:37 PM),
http://q13fox.com/2016/09/16/entire-seattle-high-school-team-kneels-during-nation
al-anthem-before-game/ [https://perma.cc/79KK-PSH6].
59. Id.
60. Rachaell Davis, This High School Football Coach Planned To Kneel Alone
During National Anthem – Then This Happened, ESSENCE (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://www.essence.com/2016/09/12/high-school-football-team-knee-support-kaeper
nick [https://perma.cc/EWF7-HPD9].
61. Blad, supra note 19.
62. Emmett Knowlton, High school player suspended for kneeling during
anthem has suspension lifted after public outcry, BUS. INSIDER: SPORTS (Sept. 12,
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/high-school-football-player-suspended-kneel
ing-during-national-anthem-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/MS67-CJRN].
63. Id.
64. See Student Protests During National Anthem & Pledge: A Resource &
Timeline, supra note 53.
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exercising their right to freedom of expression are all too familiar.
Kaepernick was subjected to severe economic sanctions in the aftermath
of his national anthem protest. For example, many sports commentators
assert that NFL teams are imposing economic sanctions on Colin
Kaepernick by not offering him a contract to play professional football.65
Additionally, despite Kaepernick’s impressive NFL record,66 players with
less skills and experience have been signed to NFL teams while
Kaepernick remains unsigned, as none of the 32 NFL teams are willing to
offer him a contract despite his free agent status.67 Although Kaepernick
was subjected to much harsher consequences than student protestors, he,
65. See Ravens owner admits that Colin Kaepernick’s protest is a factor in
whether to sign him, CETUSNEWS, http://www.cetusnews.com/news/Ravensowner-admits-that-Colin-Kaepernick’s-protest-is-a-factor-in-whether-to-sign-him
.SJ_lefp3IZ.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (providing that Baltimore Ravens
owner admits that Colin Kaepernick’s national anthem protest is a factor in whether
to offer him a contract) [https://perma.cc/GP7J-H887].
66. Raphael Garcia, Colin Kaepernick Is Actually Better Than Many of the
NFL’s First and Second-String Quarterbacks, COMPLEX SPORTS (Aug. 22, 2017),
http://www.complex.com/sports/2017/08/kaepernick-is-better-than-most-quarter
backs/ (“When compared to both starters and backups the trend is very clear:
Kaepernick’s stats are stronger than many men who are scheduled to suit up this
season. His completion percentage of 59.2 percent is higher than Jay Cutler, Blake
Bortles, Ryan Fitzpatrick, and Cam Newton. His completion percentage also
compares favorably against backups, as only Case Keenum, Matt Barkley, and
Trevor Siemian recorded better percentages while appearing in at least six
games.”) [https://perma.cc/D9ND-QZ59]. NFL teams have signed more than 30
quarterbacks since Colin Kaepernick became a free agent, 19 of which have never
completed a pass during an NFL regular season game. Considering Kaepernick
has completed 1,011 passes, many fans posit that he has been blacklisted in
response to his national anthem protest. For example, the Miami Dolphins choose
to sign a white quarterback out of retirement with inferior statistics than
Kaepernick. See Sean Gregory, ‘For Me, Its Personal.’ NFL Fans Boycott
Football As Colin Kaepernick Goes Unemployed, TIME (Sept. 1, 2017), http://time
.com/4924420/colin-kaepernick-nfl-football-boycott/ [https://perma.cc/J6JX-TV3
M]. Thomas Lott, Atlanta NAACP calls for boycott of NFL, Falcons game over
treatment of Colin Kaepernick, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.sporting
news.com/nfl/news/atlanta-naacp-boycott-nfl-falcons-colin-kaepernick/hkrlbvv9x0ff
10maxkyzzrlu1 (“Some believe Kaepernick is being blackballed by owners after he
opted out of his contract and became a free agent this offseason.”) [https://perma
.cc/N7XT-6YMF].
67. Christine Brennan, An unsigned Colin Kaepernick is a bad sign for NFL,
USA TODAY (May 4, 2017, 2:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/co
lumnist/brennan/2017/05/03/colin-kaepernick-free-agent-nfl-quarterback-nationalanthem/101259582/ [https://perma.cc/9YKE-33LT].
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unlike the students, was afforded First Amendment protections and
permitted to continue his national anthem protests.68
As previously mentioned, a great deal of opposition by school
administrators to student protests during the national anthem stems from a
concern that allowing this symbolic speech teaches students to be
disrespectful, especially in relation to honoring the men and women who
have served in the military.69 It is a well-established American tradition
and patriotic ritual to play the national anthem at sporting events and for
spectators to stand to show respect for the flag and the soldiers who
sacrificed their lives to uphold the freedom the American flag represents.70
Therefore, kneeling—as opposed to standing—during the national anthem
is considered disrespectful and offensive by many individuals in the
military and the public at large, which encompasses some school
administrators.71 For example, the principal of Lely High School in
Naples, Florida informed students that any student-athlete who refuses to
68. Chris Yuscavage, HS and College Football Players Are Being Unfairly
Penalized for National Anthem Protests, COMPLEX SPORTS (Oct. 11, 2017),
http://www.complex.com/sports/2017/10/hs-college-football-players-penalized-for
-kneeling-during-national-anthem (highlighting how high school and college
football players are being punished unfairly for engaging in national anthem
protests, unlike their NFL counterparts) [https://perma.cc/N4JG-N5DU].
69. David B. Larter, Legendary SEAL Leader: National Anthem Protests
Disrespect the Military, NAVY TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.navytimes.com
/news/your-navy/2016/09/09/legendary-seal-leader-national-anthem-protests-dis
respect-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/P9GM-PNQZ].
70. See Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement,
and the Marsh Wild Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 534 (2007) (“‘[A]rising to a
standing position upon hearing the national anthem being played,’ but merely ‘an
act showing one’s respect for the government.’”).
71. Melissa Jacobs, Week Under Review: Don’t take Kaepernick’s protest as
disrespect for military, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.si.com
/nfl/2016/08/29/colin-kaepernick-national-anthem-protest-49ers [https://perma.cc
/58VE-RG7K]; see also Kevin L. Burke, Sports and Patriotism: Why We Stand for
the National Anthem, SPORTING NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.sporting
news.com/nfl/news/sports-patriotism-national-anthem-protests-athletes-colin-kaep
ernick/1u5n4asb5tujz138i101evbdju (“From MLB, the tradition spread to other
sports throughout the United States. According to Ferris, sports fans adopted the
military’s reverence for the anthem by standing to show respect for the flag.”)
[https://perma.cc/SFT6-THSH]; 36 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“[A]ll other persons present
should face the flag and stand at attention with their right hand over the heart, and men
not in uniform, if applicable, should remove their headdress with their right hand and
hold it at the left shoulder, the hand being over the heart; and (2) when the flag is not
displayed, all present should face toward the music and act in the same manner they
would if the flag were displayed.”).
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stand during the national anthem would be removed from the game.72 The
principal stated, “‘[W]hen that anthem is being played, you are to stand
and you are to be quiet.”’73
Likewise, a principal at a high school in Honolulu, Hawaii responded
to students kneeling during the national anthem by issuing the following
statement in a letter to the faculty and staff:
The behavior of that small group of students was disrespectful to
our school and our country. It was particularly unfortunate that this
occurred over Memorial Day weekend, knowing that thousands of
KS Kapalama family members, faculty, staff and alumni have
served our country’s military to defend and uphold the freedoms we
enjoy today.74
These examples of school administrators’ reactions to student national
anthem protests demonstrate the immense disparity in how schools
respond to students’ social protests. Currently, students’ First Amendment
rights in K-12 schools reside in a sea of ambiguity. The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that students are considered “persons” under the
Constitution and thus are entitled to fundamental rights, such as freedom
of expression.75 The Court, however, marginalizes those same rights in
subsequent decisions by permitting school authorities to limit freedom of
speech under certain circumstances.76 Instead of safeguarding students’
constitutional freedoms, the Court has left the preservation of students’
rights to the discretion of overzealous school administrators who utilize
the Court’s deference to usurp student rights under the guise of school

72. Carli Teproff, Principal to Students about the anthem: ‘You are to stand and
you are to be quiet’, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 15, 2016, 10:17 PM), http://www.miami
herald.com/news/state/florida/article102151582.html [https://perma.cc/WNK86LV8].
73. Annika Hammerschlag, SWFL students react to Collier principal’s anthem
order, N APLES D AILY NEWS (Sept. 16, 2016, 9:58 PM), http://www.naples
news.com/story/news/education/2016/09/16/swfl-students-react-collier-principals
-anthem-order/90507656/ [https://perma.cc/5LKR-6TQL].
74. Mileka Lincoln, Graduating Kamehameha students refuse to stand for
national anthem, HAWAII NEWS NOW (June 16, 2016, 1:36 PM), http://www.hawaii
newsnow.com/story/32234076/kamehameha-schools-seniors-spark-debate-by-pro
testing-national-anthem-at-graduation-ceremony [https://perma.cc/BW2A-VP3K].
75. Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are ‘Persons’ Under Our
Constitution-Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2009)
(citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
76. Id. at 1324.
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order.77 Furthermore, there is no Supreme Court precedent that directly
addresses what freedom of expression rights, if any, high school athletes
have during school-sponsored sporting events. In light of the gross
disparities in relation to whether students are disciplined for kneeling
during the national anthem, it is of paramount importance to address the
quandary surrounding the scope of students’ freedom of expression rights
outside the traditional school learning environment.
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION JURISPRUDENCE: K-12 PERSPECTIVE
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”78 In assessing whether students
attending K-12 public schools have the constitutional right to engage in
social protests during school-sponsored events, such as sports, one must
examine freedom of expression jurisprudence.
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression is
arguably one of the most cherished rights guaranteed by the Constitution.79
As a nation built on democracy, citizens must be afforded the opportunity
to express themselves freely without fear of repercussions in order to
participate fully in the democratic process.80 Therefore, many legal
scholars view First Amendment protections as one of the pillars of
democracy.81 Although the express language of the Constitution only
77. Anna Boksenbaum, Shedding Your Soul at the Schoolhouse Gate: The
Chilling of Student Artistic Speech in the Post-Columbine Era, 8 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 123, 135 (2005) (“The Court’s decision that sexually suggestive speech was
unprotected by the First Amendment dealt a serious blow to Tinker’s liberal
approach, as it gave deference to school administrators to decide what kind of
speech is permissible in school and gave schools responsibility for inculcating
students into community morals and standards of behavior.”).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. Nina Petraro, Harmful Speech and True Threats: Virginia v. Black and the
First Amendment in an Age of Terrorism, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 531,
563 (2006) (“There is no doubt that Americans’ First Amendment right to free
speech is fundamental and cherished within our United States Constitution . . .”).
80. Nicole McLaughlin, Spectrum of Defamation of Religion Laws and the
Possibility of A Universal International Standard, 32 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 395, 419 (2010) (“When a country stifles freedom of expression, it threatens
democracy because democracy thrives under transparency and freedom of
speech.”).
81. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U.L. REV.
1097, 1102 (2016); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations:
Theoretically and Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L.
REV. 53, 66 (2014).
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protects freedom of speech, several different categories of protected
speech fall within its periphery.82 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
broad language of the First Amendment to include protection of symbolic
gestures and conduct because people often communicate ideas through
both verbal and non-verbal means.83 Over the years, some justices have
recognized two distinct types of speech in evaluating First Amendment
protections: (1) pure speech, which is afforded the full protections of the
Constitution; and (2) symbolic speech, which may receive only partial
protections because it includes speech plus conduct.84 An example of pure
speech is a protest or demonstration, whereas symbolic speech includes
conduct such as burning a flag or kneeling during the national anthem to
convey a particular message.85 The Court has established that when pure
speech and symbolic speech are part of the same conduct, the government
may limit First Amendment protections if there is an important
governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element.86 For
82. Christopher Cavaliere, Category Shopping: Cracking the Student Speech
Categories, 40 STETSON L. REV. 877, 879 (2011).
83. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court said,
“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of
an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is
a short cut from mind to mind.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632 (1943).
84. McGoldrick, Jr., supra note 25, at 3–4 (“An example of symbolic speech
in action is when David O’Brien burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War.
The Court assumed that the illegal act of destroying his draft card was symbolic
speech, but unprotected because of the government’s overriding interest in
protecting the Selective Service System . . . . And then there is mere conduct that,
though expressive, receives no protection as speech at all and can be regulated for
any rational reason.”); see also Amalgamated Food Emp.’s Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). The majority only referred to pure
speech. Id. at 313 (“To be sure, this Court has noted that picketing involves
elements of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling, and has indicated that
because of this intermingling of protected and unprotected elements, picketing
can be subjected to controls that would not be constitutionally permissible in the
case of pure speech.”). The concurring opinion, however, referenced speech plus.
Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Picketing is free speech plus, the plus being
physical activity that may implicate traffic and related matters. Hence the latter
aspects of picketing may be regulated.”).
85. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 5.
86. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ( “[W]hen ‘speech’
and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). The O’Brien
Court emphasized the importance of distinguishing expressive conduct protected
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example, in United States v. O’Brien, the Court held that the First
Amendment did not afford protection to the plaintiff’s act of burning his draft
registration card in protest of the Vietnam War.87 The Court reasoned that
although O’Brien’s symbolic speech was protected speech, the government’s
important interest in prohibiting the destruction of registration cards justified
narrowly construed limitations on O’Brien’s First Amendment freedoms.88
The guiding principles set forth in O’Brien for ascertaining whether symbolic
speech is protected under the First Amendment apply exclusively to adults.89
Although children do not relinquish their constitutional rights while attending
public schools,90 the Court employs a different constitutional framework for
evaluating freedom of expression rights in K-12 schools.
It is well established that students in K-12 schools possess First
Amendment rights.91 The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
by the First Amendment from conduct that is expressive, but is not afforded First
Amendment protections. Id. The Court provided the following criteria to
determine when a restriction on conduct that involved speech and nonspeech
elements—that is, nonverbal expression—is constitutionally permissible: (1) the
restriction is within the government’s constitutional powers; (2) the intent of the
governmental actions is to pursue a legitimate governmental action; (3) the
governmental interest is not related to restricting expression; and (4) the
restriction that results is tailored narrowly to meet the government interest. See id.
It is important to note that many legal scholars criticize the O’Brien Court for
delineating between symbolic speech and conduct, arguing that it is impossible to
make such a distinction. See Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social
Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1844–45 (1997); see also McGoldrick, Jr.,
supra note 25.
87. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
88. Id. at 376 (“The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual
described thereon has registered for the draft. The classification certificate shows
the eligibility classification of a named but undescribed individual. Voluntarily
displaying the two certificates is an easy and painless way for a young man to
dispel a question as to whether he might be delinquent in his Selective Service
obligations. Correspondingly, the availability of the certificates for such display
relieves the Selective Service System of the administrative burden it would
otherwise have in verifying the registration and classification of all suspected
delinquents.”).
89. The Court did not even reference the O’Brien Test in its Tinker decision.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
90. Id. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students.
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
91. Id.
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community of American schools.”92 To this end, the Supreme Court has
issued a series of decisions upholding students’ constitutional rights in K12 schools. The 1943 Supreme Court decision in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette provided the legal framework for assessing
students’ First Amendment rights in K-12 schools for more than 25
years.93 Barnette solidified not only students’ First Amendment right to
free speech but also the right not to be compelled by school authorities to
express adherence to a particular viewpoint.94 Although Barnette made a
significant contribution to freedom of expression jurisprudence, the
landmark Tinker v. Des Moines case and the subsequent trilogy of First
Amendment cases provide a modern legal framework for free speech
rights in today’s K-12 schools.95 Many scholars view Tinker as the
pinnacle of student free speech protections because the Court granted
unbridled First Amendment protections to students as long as their
expression did not materially disrupt the school learning environment.96
92. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(“[T]he First Amendment . . . does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom.”); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“That they are
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government
as mere platitudes.”).
93. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
94. Id. at 642, 644 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”).
95. Andrew D. M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student
Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 626 (2002).
96. Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in
Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1282 (2008) (“Scholars view
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District as the high-water
mark of student speech protection and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions,
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick (the Bong Hits case) as a considerable retreat
from this mark.”); Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of the "Hazardous Freedom"
of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1502, 1506 (2008)
(“The high water point for students’ First Amendment rights came in the first case
directly on the question that the Supreme Court decided, Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.”); Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the
Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J.
611, 618 (2010) (“Tinker is generally hailed by scholars as the high-water mark
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The subsequent Supreme Court decisions incrementally diminished the
Tinker Court’s stance regarding students’ free speech rights by carving out
a series of exceptions that severely limited students’ free speech rights in K12 schools.97 The following discussion highlights the complex landscape of
free speech jurisprudence in the context of K-12 schools.
A. Mind to Mind Framework: West Virginia v. Barnette
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the West
Virginia Legislature amended a statute to require schools to offer courses
in both history and civics for the purpose of “teaching, fostering, and
perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirits of Americanism . . . .”98 The
local Board of Education responded to the statutory amendments by
adopting a resolution making the flag salute part of the regular school
program and activities.99 The flag salute mandate required students to give
a stiff-arm salute while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance out of honor and
respect for the nation or be subjected to disciplinary action.100 Although
the compulsory flag salute policy appeared neutral on its face, in practice
it had a significant impact on certain groups of students because it
conflicted with their religious beliefs.101 Two students at Slip Grade
School in West Virginia, Marie and Gathie Barnette, refused to salute the
flag because it conflicted with their religious beliefs as Jehovah’s
Witness.102 As a result, the Barnettes and several other children who
practiced the Jehovah’s Witness faith were expelled from school for their

of student free speech”); Matthew Sheffield, Stop with the Exceptions: A Narrow
Interpretation of Tinker for All Student Speech Claims, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 175, 176 (2011).
97. Aaron J. Hersh, Note, Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest Proposal to
Protect Public-School Students’ First Amendment Free Expression Rights in the
Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1321 (2013) (“While Tinker remains the
foundational precedent of student free expression doctrine, it has not gone
unchanged. The Supreme Court has invoked its underlying principles as guides in
three subsequent decisions –Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick . . . . These opinions reflect
a degradation of Tinker’s First Amendment principles . . . .”); Alison Hofheimer,
Saved by the Bell? Is Online, Off-Campus Student Speech Protected by the First
Amendment?, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 971, 976 (2013).
98. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625.
99. Id. at 626.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 629.
102. Id.
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refusal to participate in the flag salute.103 Furthermore, the expelled
children’s parents also experienced adverse consequences for their
children’s religious stance.104 Many of the parents either were prosecuted
or threatened with prosecution for violating state truancy laws, which
categorize a child that is expelled as unlawfully absent, thus subjecting
their parents or guardians to criminal penalties, including fines and
imprisonment for up to 30 days.105 School authorities also threatened to
send the children practicing the Jehovah’s Witness faith to reformatories
for juvenile delinquents.106 The Barnettes, on behalf of their children and
other citizens, responded to the harsh disciplinary actions by filing suit in
district court, seeking an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Board
of Education’s flag salute mandate and regulations against Jehovah’s
Witnesses attending West Virginia public schools.107
Barnette exemplifies the ongoing struggle many courts experience as they
attempt to strike a balance between constitutionalism and patriotism. The
Barnette Court explicitly acknowledged that “the case is made difficult not
because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved
is our own.”108 Thus, although a member of the judiciary may feel a civic duty
to uphold the principles of the Constitution, he also may feel a moral
obligation to preserve socially-constructed notions of patriotism.109 Because
the American flag is at the heart of the Barnette decision, dichotomizing
personal and political allegiance from constitutional analysis is an arduous
task. This moral quandary continues to persist more than 70 years after
Barnette as school administrators attempt to reconcile the societal pressure of
requiring student-athletes to stand during the national anthem while still
preserving the athletes’ constitutional freedom of expression rights.110
103. Id.
104. Id. at 630.
105. Id. at 629; W. VA. CODE § 4904(4) (Supp. 1941).
106. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
107. Id. at 629.
108. Id. at 641.
109. See generally Ronald C. Den Otter, The Place of Moral Judgment in
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 IND. L. REV. 375 (discussing the required
constitutional analysis by judges in morally and factually complicated cases).
110. Russell, supra note 54 (“High school athletes, coaches and administrators
across Maine are grappling with the increasingly bitter debate over whether
kneeling during the national anthem is an acceptable form of protest.”); see also
Scott Berson, These schools will punish athletes who protest the anthem. Is that
against the law?, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:02 AM), http://www.miami
herald.com/news/nation-world/national/article176084591.html (highlighting the
challenges school administrators, like Superintendent Scott Smith, face as they find
themselves forced to choose between preserving students’ First Amendment rights
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The Barnette decision served as the catalyst for a significant paradigm
shift in First Amendment constitutional jurisprudence. In Barnette, the
Supreme Court overruled earlier per curiam Pledge of Allegiance
decisions, including the landmark Minersville School District v. Gobitis111
decision, and held that a state no longer could infringe upon students’ First
Amendment freedom of speech and religious rights under the guise of
nationalism.112 The Court described symbolic speech as a “short cut from
mind to mind” because it encompasses the use of a symbol to communicate a
particular message.113 Although Barnette may be categorized as a free
exercise of religion case, the Court emphasized that the students’ right not to
speak was part of their First Amendment freedoms under the Freedom of
Speech Clause; therefore, the state did not have the constitutional right to
compel students to profess any particular matter of opinion.114 As Justice
Jackson eloquently stated, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”115
Although Barnette involved a religious rejection to a patriotic ritual
school mandate, striking similarities exist between the flag salute mandate
in Barnette and the modern-day school mandate for students to stand
during the national anthem. First, in both scenarios students refused to
follow a school mandate to participate in a patriotic ritual. In Barnette, the
Jehovah’s Witness students refused to salute the flag and recite the Pledge
of Allegiance; in the current education milieu, students are refusing to
stand during the national anthem.116 Second, in both scenarios students
asserted that their decision to engage or not engage in symbolic speech
and requiring them to stand for the national anthem as a sign of respect for the
United States) [https://perma.cc/V96Y-2QXL].
111. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (holding that a
state statute requiring K-12 students to salute the national flag during their daily
school exercises is constitutional). Justice Frankfurter, relying on substantive due
process principles, reasoned that a state has a rational basis to require students to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance and the allowance of any exemptions, including
on religious grounds, would undermine school discipline and send a negative
message to students about the importance of respecting the American flag. The
Court further reasoned that a statute requiring a Pledge of Allegiance mandate in
public schools is a rational means of teaching patriotism in schools. See id.
112. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; John J. Concannon III, The Pledge of
Allegiance and the First Amendment, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (1989).
113. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.
114. Id. at 633–34.
115. Id. at 642.
116. Id. at 628–29; see also discussion supra Part. I.B.

170

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

was protected under the First Amendment. Finally, both situations involve
authoritative figures trying to reconcile the challenge of balancing
students’ freedom of expression rights with fostering a spirit of patriotism
among students. Based on these similarities, one can argue that students’
symbolic conduct of kneeling during the national anthem to protest police
brutality is protected speech because Barnette clearly established that it is
unconstitutional for the state to compel students to participate in symbolic
speech or profess any particular matter of opinion.117 Therefore, one can
infer that if it is impermissible for students to be compelled by the state to
profess any particular matter of opinion, then students also may not be
restricted from expressing their opinions through symbolic speech.
B. The Gold Standard: Tinker v. Des Moines
Tinker v. Des Moines is considered the cornerstone of freedom of
expression jurisprudence in the context of K-12 schools.118 Tinker
solidified the idea that children do not “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression or speech at the schoolhouse” door.119 This
profound statement conveys the importance of recognizing and preserving
the constitutional freedoms of students to the greatest extent possible while
attending K-12 public schools. The central issue in Tinker was whether the
prohibition of students wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam War
violated students’ First Amendment freedom of expression rights.120 The
facts in this case involved a group of students who attended Des Moines
public schools and who planned on wearing black armbands to school as
a symbolic protest against the Vietnam War.121 The principals in the school
district became aware of the planned student protests and adopted a policy
banning students from wearing armbands to school.122 Under the new
policy, a student found wearing an armband to school would be asked to
remove it or be suspended from school until the student returned without
the armband in compliance with the school policy.123 Despite knowledge
117. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
118. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at
the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527
(2000) (“Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is the
most important Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights
of students.”).
119. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
120. Id. at 507–08.
121. Id. at 504.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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of the school’s policy, students Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher
Eckhardt wore the armbands to school.124 As a result, they were suspended
from school and not permitted to return until either they complied with the
policy or the period for the armband protest expired.125 A complaint was
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia on behalf of the students under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code, seeking an injunction to prevent the school district
from disciplining the students for their symbolic expression.126 The district
court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the students’ First
Amendment freedom of expression rights were not infringed when school
leaders forbade the students’ expression to prevent disturbing the school
environment.127 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s decision.128
In reviewing the appellate court decision, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on the guiding principle that states and school officials should be
afforded great deference to prescribe and control student conduct in schools
as long as their actions are consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards.129 The Court emphasized that “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression,” but rather the expressive conduct must materially and substantially
interfere with the school learning environment.130 In applying these guiding
principles to the facts in Tinker, the Court opined that there was no indication
that school authorities reasonably could forecast a material disruption of the
school learning environment or a substantial disruption.131 To the contrary,
no disruptions to the school environment occurred as a result of the student
armband protests nor were there any efforts by the student protestors to
infringe on the rights of others.132 Justice Fortas, writing for the majority,
reasoned that although the students’ symbolic armband protest caused
discussions to occur outside of the classroom, there were no instances of
disorderly conduct or interference with classwork.133 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that unless school authorities can provide an evidentiary

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id.
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basis for constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
must be afforded their constitutional right to freedom of speech.134
This landmark Supreme Court case established the Material
Disruption Standard, which prohibits school authorities from infringing
upon students’ freedom of expression rights unless such conduct causes a
material and substantial disruption to the school environment.135 For many
years the Tinker Material Disruption Standard has been the gatekeeper for
students’ First Amendment rights in schools. The educational landscape,
however, has changed immensely since the Court’s decision 48 years ago. For
instance, some parents now are sending their children to charter schools or
homeschooling them, bullying is more prevalent, and technology and the
Internet are embedded heavily within school environments. Significant
changes in education such as these have created formidable challenges
as school leaders and lower courts express differing views regarding the
appropriate application of the Tinker Material Disruption Standard in
today’s schooling context.136 Although this Article focuses on revamping
Tinker’s standard to provide better protections for students’ symbolic
speech rights, it is important to note other areas of concern regarding
Tinker’s effectiveness in safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights.
For example, school leaders are unsure of their authority over student
speech that occurs off-campus on social media sites, such as Facebook and

134. Id. at 511.
135. Id.
136. Rory Allen Weeks, Note, The First Amendment, Public School Students,
and the Need for Clear Limits on School Officials’ Authority over Off-Campus
Student Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157, 1192–93 (2012) (“[C]ourts should not
interpret Tinker so that it applies to all off-campus student speech that could
offend other students or even devastate their well-being. By interpreting Tinker
this way, school officials’ authority to regulate off-campus speech will be
analogous to that which parents have over a visiting child.”); Shannon M. Raley,
Note, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for the Internet Era,
59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 773, 775 (2011) (“[T]he Tinker standard cannot adequately
encompass situations that arise in today’s Internet-centered world because a great
deal of Internet-originated speech does not occur ‘on-campus’ and courts are
unsure of what exactly constitutes a ‘substantial disruption’ as required by
Tinker.”); Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the ‘Outer Boundaries’
of the First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the
Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 733
(2010) (advocating for the adoption of a new free speech standard for K-12
schools to evaluate the constitutionality of student Internet speech. The proposed
new standard integrates both prongs of Tinker to evaluate students’ constitutional
rights in Internet speech cases).
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Snapchat, yet causes a material disruption on campus.137 Additionally,
school authorities are trying to reconcile the tension between peer sexual
harassment law and students’ freedom of expression rights.138 Specifically,
many school leaders are finding themselves in a doctrinal quandary when
speech that is protected under the Tinker standard also triggers Title IX
sexual harassment liability.139 All of the aforementioned issues regarding
the application of Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard in today’s
educational milieu illuminate the standard’s limited utility in today’s
educational environment as well as the need to consider revising the
standard to improve its effectiveness in safeguarding students’ First
Amendment rights.
C. Birth of Censorship: Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser
Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser addresses an important area in
freedom of expression jurisprudence in K-12 schools—administrative
censorship of lewd or offensive speech.140 Although the Court in Tinker
established that school authorities may not infringe upon the freedom of
expression rights of students unless their conduct causes a material
disruption to the school’s operation and discipline, the Court failed to
address the appropriate action when a student’s conduct does not cause a
material disruption but violates a school rule. The question remains
whether students in K-12 public schools are granted unbridled freedom of
expression rights as long as they do not cause a material disruption to the
school learning environment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review Fraser to address this legal conundrum.
In Fraser, a high school student, Matthew Fraser, was suspended from
school for lewd remarks he made during a speech in which he nominated
a classmate for student elective office.141 Fraser discussed the contents of

137. See supra note 96.
138. Lynn Mostoller, Freedom of Speech and Freedom from Student-onStudent Sexual Harassment in Public Schools: The Nexus Between Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District and Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, 33 N.M. L. REV. 533, 534 (2003).
139. Id. at 556–57.
140. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
141. Id. at 677. Fraser’s explicit speech stated:
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt,
his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students
of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds
it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t
attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
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the speech beforehand with two of his teachers, both of whom forewarned
him that the content was inappropriate and that he would be in violation
of the school’s offensive speech policy if he delivered the speech without
making their suggested changes.142 Bethel High School’s disciplinary
policy for inappropriate language stated that “[c]onduct which materially
and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited,
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”143 Fraser
delivered the speech without making any changes and was suspended for
three days.144 Fraser challenged his suspension through the school
district’s grievance process.145 The hearing officer, however, upheld the
school’s disciplinary action, concluding that Fraser’s speech violated the
school policy because it was lewd, indecent, and offensive.146
Fraser’s father filed suit on his behalf in district court, alleging that the
school’s disciplinary action violated Fraser’s First Amendment freedom
of speech rights.147 The district court found that the school’s offensive
speech policy was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and that the
school’s disciplinary actions violated Fraser’s First Amendment freedom
of speech rights.148 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s decision, rejecting the school district’s stance that
disciplinary action is necessary to protect a captive audience of minors
from being exposed to lewd and indecent speech.149 The Supreme Court,
however, took a different stance and overruled the lower court decisions
by holding that it is permissible constitutionally for school authorities to
impose disciplinary sanctions upon students for lewd and indecent speech.150
The Court addressed Fraser’s argument that his speech was protected under
the Tinker Material Disruption Standard151 by distinguishing between the
protected political speech from Tinker v. Des Moines and Fraser’s unprotected
finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even
the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B.
vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high
school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 679 (majority opinion).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 680.
150. Id. at 685.
151. Id. at 680–85; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 514 (1969); supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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sexually explicit speech.152 Specifically, the Court asserted that the First
Amendment does not protect the type of indecent and lewd language present
in Fraser’s graduation speech because such discourse undermines the
fundamental values that public schools are trying to instill among students,
such as understanding socially appropriate behavior.153 The Court reasoned
that Fraser’s use of sexually explicit language to an audience that included
younger students demonstrated his lack of discretion in determining not only
the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior but the potential harmful
consequences of his actions.154
Although the Fraser Court did not overturn Tinker, it did narrow
substantially its reach by carving out an exception for lewd and offensive
speech. For these reasons, one of the most profound proclamations made by
the Fraser Court is that “the constitutional rights of students in public school
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”155
This statement diminishes the power behind the Tinker Court’s robust
promulgation that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”156 On the one hand, the Court is establishing the
importance of not treating students as second-class citizens and preserving
their constitutional protections to the greatest extent possible in K-12 school
settings. On the other hand, the Court is undermining that very position by
emphasizing that, although students maintain some constitutional protections
in K-12 schools, they are not the full rights afforded to adults in other settings.
A great deal of the Fraser decision’s scholarly critiques focus on the
Court’s dramatic departure from Tinker’s speech-protective jurisprudence and
the challenges associated with defining the scope of Fraser’s reach.157 Fraser
is viewed as part of a growing trend of courts diminishing students’ free
speech rights by affording school administrators greater deference in
determining protected speech.158 As Justice Burger enunciated in Fraser,
“The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”159 It is this
152. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686.
153. Id. at 681.
154. Id. at 683.
155. Id. at 682.
156. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
157. See Nina Zollo, Comment, Constitutional Law: School Has Broad Discretion
to Prohibit Offensive Student Speech, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 193, 203 (1987).
158. David L. Hudson & John E. Ferguson, The Courts’ Inconsistent
Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 182 (2002).
159. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
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expansive discretionary authority granted to school administrators by the
Fraser Court that has received the greatest criticism among free speech
advocates who predict that the Court’s departure from Tinker’s speechprotective jurisprudence will have a “chilling effect” on student free
speech rights.160 In response to this prediction, Jonathan Pyle argues that
Fraser should be overturned and the Tinker Material Disruption Standard
should govern school censorship of student speech.161 If the Court had applied
the Tinker standard in Fraser, as Pyle suggests, the outcome would have been
considerably different because the facts in Fraser do not support Tinker’s
requisite material disruption of the educational process to warrant infringing
on students’ free speech rights.162 The likelihood of Fraser being overturned,
however, is improbable in light of the current conservative make-up of the
Court and the cases that preceded Fraser that support curtailing student free
speech rights.163 Another area of scholarly critique of Fraser focuses on the
intended scope of the standard. How broad is Fraser’s reach in terms of what
lewd or offensive speech may be censored? Specifically, some scholars
question whether lower courts should apply a broad application of Fraser that
permits school authorities to censor any speech they deem lewd or offensive

160. See Zollo, supra note 157 (“By giving schools broad discretion, the
instant Court ignores its own warnings of the chilling effects inherent in
prohibiting speech offensive to some members of society.”); see also Therese
Thibodeaux, Note, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: The Supreme Court
Supports School in Sanctioning Student for Sexual Innuendo in Speech, 33 LOY.
L. REV. 516, 525 (1987) (noting that the Fraser decision represents a retreat from
the Court’s “progressive stance” to the pre-Tinker ideology of allowing school
authorities unbridled deference supporting the in loco parentis role of schools);
Phoebe Graubard, Note, The Expanded Role of School Administrators and
Governing Boards in First Amendment Student Speech Disputes: Bethel School
District v. Fraser, 17 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 257, 271 (1987) (highlighting
Fraser’s departure from Tinker’s expansive student free speech rights).
161. Pyle, supra note 23, at 633 (“[T]he Tinker disruption standard, and
nothing more, should govern the school’s regulation of independent student
speech.”).
162. Sara Slaff, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 217–18 (1987).
163. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“[A] principal may,
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event,
when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”); see also
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (establishing that
public school officials can censor school-sponsored expression for legitimate
educational purposes).
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or a narrower reading that only permits censorship of speech that is
sponsored by the school.164
The uncertainty surrounding the scope of Fraser is evident by the
varied lower court interpretations of the standard articulated by the Court
for censoring inappropriate speech. For example, in a Sixth Circuit case,
Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, the court broadly interpreted
Fraser to permit censorship of student expression that does not align with
the school’s educational mission or conflicts with the fundamental values of
public schools.165 This broad interpretation of Fraser enhances the school’s
role as in loco parentis while simultaneously minimizing students’ free
speech protections.166 In a similar case, however, the Second Circuit took a
very different doctrinal stance and narrowly interpreted Fraser to permit
school censorship for expression involving profanity or sexual innuendos
only if it occurs during a school-sponsored activity.167 Thus, under the
Second Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Fraser the focus is on the context in
which the language occurred as opposed to whether the speech is lewd or
offensive.168 The lack of consensus among the judiciary regarding the scope of
Fraser illustrates the ongoing tension between affording school administrators
enough discretionary power to maintain school discipline and order and
preserving students’ free speech rights. This conundrum continues in the next
164. Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 158, at 191 (“The problem originates in
the way Fraser is interpreted by some lower courts. The issue that has caused a
split in the First Amendment’s application is whether Fraser allows schools to
censor any speech deemed vulgar or offensive (broad reading), or whether Fraser
only allows the regulation of speech that is sponsored by the school (narrow
reading).”); see also Sarah Tope Reise, “Just Say No” to Pro-Drug and Alcohol
Student Speech: The Constitutionality of School Prohibitions of Student Speech
Promoting Drug and Alcohol Use, 57 EMORY L.J. 1259, 1287–88 (2008)
(explaining that some courts reject a broad reading of Fraser because it essentially
would overrule the principles set forth in Tinker. Specifically, Tinker’s disruption
requirement is intended to prevent school authorities from prohibiting any
expression simply because they find it disagreeable. Thus, a broad interpretation
of Fraser would undermine this principle by allowing school authorities to
circumvent Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard to censor protected speech
unlawfully.).
165. Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2000).
166. Reise, supra note 164, at 1279.
167. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2nd Cir. 2006) (“To summarize:
Under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane language.
Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored speech . . . . Speech
falling outside of these categories is subject to Tinker’s general rule . . . .” (quoting
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001))).
168. Id. at 326.
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student free speech case before the Supreme Court, Hazelwood School
District et al. v. Kuhlmeier.169
D. Curriculum Matters: Hazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier
The Court’s ruling in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
represents yet another exception to Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard
and permits school administrators to limit students’ freedom of expression
rights, even in the absence of a material disruption.170 The Court in
Hazelwood established that educators did not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as
their actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”171
The facts in Hazelwood involve a group of students that challenged the
constitutionality of a principal’s censorship of a student newspaper that was
part of a student journalism class at Hazelwood East High School.172 Each
semester, before the student newspaper went to print, page proofs had to be
submitted to the principal for final approval.173 The students submitted the
page proofs to the principal, who rejected two of the articles for publication.174
In regards to the first article, the principal had privacy concerns regarding
concealing the identity of the pregnant students featured in the article.175
Additionally, the principal was concerned that some of the sexual references
in the article were too advanced for some of the younger members of the
student body.176 The second article rejected by the principal discussed the
impact of divorce on students, in which a student criticized his father for not
being around enough and made other negative comments regarding his
parents.177 The principal reasoned that the parents should be allowed to
respond to their son’s assertions prior to the article being published.178 As
a result of a tight publication deadline, the principal decided not to publish
the two articles of concern.179 The high school journalism students filed

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 289.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263–64.
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suit, alleging that the principal’s actions violated their constitutional free
speech rights.180
Hazelwood was the first student free speech case before the Supreme
Court by which the Court critically evaluated students’ free speech rights
in the context of school-sponsored activities.181 The Court, by a 5-3 vote,
held that the principal’s censorship of the school-sponsored newspaper did
not violate students’ free speech rights.182 The Court based its decision on
a public forum analysis that evaluated whether the school newspaper may
be categorized as a forum for public expression.183 The Court reasoned that
the school newspaper could not be categorized as a public forum because
the school never deviated from its policy that designated the student
newspaper as part of the educational curriculum and not a vehicle for
public expression.184 Significantly, the Court distinguished the speech at
issue in Hazelwood from the speech in Tinker to illustrate the need to adopt
a new standard governing students’ free speech rights in the context of
school-sponsored curriculum activities.185 In Hazelwood, the Court
considered the educator’s control over school-sponsored expressive
activities, such as student newspapers, that might be perceived as bearing
the “imprimatur of the school.”186 In Tinker, however, the Court’s inquiry
examined whether it is constitutionally permissible for school authorities
to limit a student’s individual freedom of expression that happens to occur
180. Id. at 264. Respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri. “The District Court concluded that school
officials may impose restraints on students’ speech in activities that are ‘an
integral part of the school’s educational function—including the publication of a
school-sponsored newspaper by a journalism class—so long as their decision has
‘a substantial and reasonable basis.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
181. Id. at 266–76.
182. Id. at 276.
183. William M. Howard, Constitutionality of Restricting Public Speech in
Street, Sidewalk, Park, or Other Public Forum – Manner of Restriction, 71
A.L.R.6th 471 (2012). It is well established in constitutional jurisprudence that
content-based restrictions that occur in traditional public forums are subject to
strict scrutiny. The government normally can impose only content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech in a public forum. Examples of public
forums are city parks and sidewalks. See also Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum As
A First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech
Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722
(2009) (“The traditional public forum doctrine content-based speech restrictions
in a designated public forum are subject to strict scrutiny.”).
184. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 269.
185. Id. at 272.
186. Id. at 271.
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in school.187 In evaluating the record, the Court concluded that educators
should have the authority to censor free speech that is part of the
educational curriculum to ensure that the speech is age-appropriate and
accomplishes the desired learning objectives.188
The Hazelwood decision, like many of the free speech cases following
the Tinker decision, has been met with stark criticism from free speech
advocates for carving out yet another exception that limits student
speech.189 Constitutional law expert Erwin Chemerinsky asserts that the
Hazelwood decision is historic because it ushers in a paradigm shift from
Tinker’s speech-protective rhetoric to an authoritative approach that
affords great deference to school authorities to punish student speech.190
Chemerinsky’s assertion is supported by several other scholars who
criticize the Hazelwood decision for diminishing students’ First
Amendment rights by increasing the deference given to school authorities

187. Id. at 270–71 (“The question whether the First Amendment requires a
school to tolerate particular student speech—the question that we addressed in
Tinker—is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a
school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question
addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that
happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators’
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”); see also Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
188. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
189. See, e.g., Frank D. LoMonte, "The Key Word Is Student": Hazelwood
Censorship Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 306
(2013) (“In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court carved out a category of ‘curricular’
speech that, in the majority’s view, was entitled to minimal First Amendment
protection.”); Cavaliere, supra note 82, at 885 (“Whatever general rule the Court
may have attempted to create in Tinker has been chiseled away by the Court’s
subsequent student speech decisions. Now, whether a school may silence student
speech depends on whether the speech falls within any one of four categories of
unprotected expression: a school may limit student speech if it is disruptive under
Tinker, ugly under Fraser, school sponsored under Hazelwood, or drugpromoting under Morse.”); Shari Golub, Note, Tinker to Fraser to Hazelwood–
Supreme Court’s Double Play Combination Defeats High School Students’ Rally
for First Amendment Rights: Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 38 DEPAUL
L. REV. 487, 504–05 (1989) (explaining that the Hazelwood Court “conveniently
evaded” the “appropriate balance” struck by the Tinker Court.).
190. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The
Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 292 (2013).
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to limit free speech.191 For example, one scholar contends that Hazelwood
undermines students’ First Amendment rights by allowing school
authorities to use their discretionary power to categorize student speech
freely and suppress it without any fear of judicial oversight.192 Some states
have responded to the Hazelwood decision by passing legislation to extend
students’ constitutional protections for school newspapers in hopes of
avoiding a chilling effect on free speech.193
E. Guiding the Moral Compass: Morse v. Frederick
In Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court examined whether prohibiting
students from displaying messages that support the use of illegal drugs during
a school-supervised event violates the First Amendment.194 In Morse,
students at Juneau-Douglas High School were permitted to observe the
Olympic Torch Relay scheduled to proceed along the street in front of the
high school as part of a school-sponsored event.195 This was a monumental
event because it was the first time in American history that the Olympic
Torch Relay passed through Alaska.196 Therefore, the principal reasoned
that permitting students to leave class and observe the Olympic
torchbearers from the street had educational value and allowed students to

191. Mark J. Fiore, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against
Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1929
(2002) (“As a result of the Hazelwood decision, secondary schools have censored
student speech far more rampantly in the past decade than in previous years.”);
see also Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School
Journalist, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 433, 451 (2000) (“Perhaps the most obvious criticism
of Hazelwood is that the standard ‘translates into essentially no judicial review of
the school authorities’ conduct.’”).
192. S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs-Repression, Rights,
and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 137
(1995).
193. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (2017) (“The right of students to
freedom of expression in the public schools of the commonwealth shall not be
abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder within
the school.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-120(2) (2017) (“If a publication written
substantially by students is made generally available throughout a public school,
it shall be a public forum for students of such school.”); IOWA CODE § 280.22
(2017) (“[S]tudents of the public schools have the right to exercise freedom of
speech, including the right of expression in official school publications.”).
194. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
195. Id. at 397.
196. Id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

182

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

be a part of a historic event.197 The controversy that ensued revolved
around the plaintiff, Joseph Frederick, a senior at Juneau-Douglas High
School.198 He and his friends decided to watch the Olympic Torch Relay
across the street from the school.199 As the torchbearers and media crew
passed by, Frederick and his friends unveiled a 14-foot banner that read
“BONG HITS 4 JESUS.”200 Principal Morse demanded that the students
take down the banner immediately because it promoted illegal drug use.201
Every student complied except for Frederick.202 The principal confiscated
the banner and instructed Frederick to come to his office.203 Frederick
defiantly relinquished the banner and walked in the other direction.204
Principal Morse suspended Frederick for ten days for violating the schools
anti-drug policy by promoting illegal drug use during a school-sponsored
activity.205 The school’s anti-drug policy stated: “The Board specifically
prohibits any assembly or public expression that . . . advocates the use of
substances that are illegal to minors.”206 Additionally, the school’s policy
explicitly stated that “pupils who participate in approved social events and
class trips” are subject to the disciplinary consequences for violating any
such policies.207
Frederick filed a suit in the United States District Court of Alaska
against the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that both the
school board and principal violated his First Amendment rights.208 The
district court ruled in favor of the principal and school board, finding that
their actions did not violate Frederick’s First Amendment freedom of
expression rights.209 The court reasoned that the principal was reasonable
in interpreting the “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” banner as promoting illegal
drug use, and, thus, disciplinary action was appropriate for Frederick’s
violation of the school board’s anti-drug policy.210 The district court

197. Id. at 397 (majority opinion).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. It is common knowledge that the phrase “bong hits” refers to smoking
marijuana.
201. Id. at 397–98.
202. Id. at 398.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 399.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 402.
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emphasized that Principal Morse had the authority to stop such messages
during a school-sponsored activity.211 The plaintiff appealed the district
court’s finding that the principal’s actions did not violate his First Amendment
rights.212 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that despite the banner advocating
for illegal drug use, Principal Morse violated Frederick’s First Amendment
rights because he preemptively disciplined Frederick without demonstrating
that his symbolic speech was likely to cause a material disruption to the school
activity.213
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision by a 6-3 vote
and held that the principal’s confiscation of Frederick’s banner, which
promoted illegal drug use, was not a violation of his First Amendment free
speech rights.214 The Court reasoned that schools must be permitted to
regulate speech that encourages illegal drug use to students entrusted in
their care.215 The Court found the principal’s response reasonable in light
of Frederick’s actions of brandishing a pro-drug banner in front of his
peers and the school staff at a school-sponsored event.216 The Court
referenced the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, which
requires schools receiving federal funds to make a concerted effort to
promote a drug-free environment.217 Therefore, the principal’s actions not
only were reasonable but part of his responsibility in the management of
the school.218 The Court also cited previous Supreme Court decisions that
illuminated the important role schools play in deterring illegal drug use.219
Ultimately, the Court concluded that schools should not be required to turn
a blind eye to the promotion of illegal drug use under the auspices of First
Amendment freedom of expression rights.220
211. Id. at 410.
212. Id. at 399–400.
213. Id. at 396.
214. Id. at 397.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 395; see also Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act,
20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2017).
218. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408.
219. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661–62 (“School years are
the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most
severe. ‘Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than
mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound’; ‘children
grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of recovery is
depressingly poor.’ And of course, the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not
just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational
process is disrupted.”) (internal citations omitted).
220. Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
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The criticism of Morse has been especially harsh because the Court
created more uncertainty in the already muddled waters of freedom of
expression jurisprudence in schools. One scholar encapsulates what is
described as the intellectual puzzle created by Morse for lower courts,
citing four different possible interpretations of how to assess whether
speech advocating drug use may be censored in schools.221 First, one may
interpret that Justice Roberts created a narrow drug exception that permits
limiting student speech that promotes illegal drug use.222 A second view is
that the Morse Court simply applied the Tinker standard by finding that
drugs constitute a material disruption to schools.223 A third interpretation
of the legal standard put forth in Morse is that the Court expanded the
authority of school administrators by permitting them to decide what
qualifies as constitutionally protected speech in schools.224 Lastly, the
fourth doctrinal interpretation of Morse is that although the decision did
not overrule Tinker, it substantially restricted Tinker’s ability to protect
student rights by carving out yet another exception to Tinker’s Material
Disruption Standard.225 Although the aforementioned list of Morse
interpretations are not exhaustive, the scholar’s critique illuminates the
need for clarity regarding the proper application of the Tinker standard in
regulating speech in K-12 schools. Some scholars have responded to the
ambiguity in Morse by suggesting the adoption of a new four-part test for
assessing the constitutionality of any censored student speech.226
The Morse case illuminates the ongoing trend of courts struggling to
protect students’ free speech rights without impeding school administrators’
ability to maintain a school environment conducive to learning. In light of
the continuously changing contexts of today’s schools, courts likely will
continue to face the endemic challenges associated with students’ free
speech rights in K-12 schools.
In sum, Barnette, Tinker, Hazelwood, Fraser, and Morse collectively
create the framework for evaluating students’ free speech rights in K-12
schools.227 Although Tinker’s speech-protective rhetoric was intended to
221. Joyce Dindo, The Various Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick: Just A
Drug Exception or A Retraction of Student Free Speech Rights?, 37 CAP. U. L.
REV. 201, 221 (2008).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 362 (2007).
227. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624 (1943)
(asserting that the First Amendment gives students not only the right to speak, but
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solidify students’ First Amendment rights in schools, it is evident by the
Court’s dismantling of Tinker’s protections through a series of exceptions228
that students shed a substantial portion of their First Amendment rights at the
schoolhouse door.229 The impact of the current paradigm shift from speechprotective rhetoric to speech-limiting rhetoric is especially apparent in the
treatment of students’ symbolic speech in the context of national anthem
protests. Instead of protecting students’ symbolic speech during national
anthem protests, school authorities are using the discretionary power
bestowed upon them by the Court to silence student voices.230 The
aforementioned legal framework for protecting students’ free speech
rights in K-12 schools does not adequately shield students participating in
national anthem protests from impermissible encroachments on their
constitutional rights. The existing legal framework for symbolic speech in
schools must be evaluated and restructured to safeguard students’ rights.
III. UNCHARTED WATERS: SAFEGUARDING
STUDENTS’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
The insurgence of student national anthem protests at school-sponsored
athletic events has raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of existing free
speech doctrine in safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights. The legal
doctrine established in Tinker, Fraser, Morse, and Hazelwood concomitantly
creates today’s modern legal framework for evaluating students’ free speech
rights. The current free speech jurisprudence established in these cases,
however, fails to provide students with adequate protection of their First
Amendment rights, especially in the context of student national anthem
protests. As a result, students across the country attempting to exercise
their freedom of expression rights are being disciplined for kneeling
the right not to speak; school authorities may not compel students to salute the
flag); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (asserting that student symbolic
speech promoting illegal drug use my be limited); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (asserting that lewd and offensive student speech
during school-sponsored activities may be censored); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (asserting that school authorities may limit
school-sponsored activities that are part of the educational curriculum).
228. Sheffield, supra note 96, at 176 (“The Tinker decision has been treated
by many as the high-water mark for the First Amendment rights of students in
public schools. Accordingly, the subsequent Supreme Court decisions on the issue
of students’ free speech rights in public schools, each of which found for the
respective school district, are treated as substantial retreats from the First
Amendment protections that students received under the Tinker decision.”).
229. See id.
230. Blad, supra note 19; see also discussion supra Part I.B.
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during the national anthem.231 This section highlights the shortfalls of
existing First Amendment jurisprudence and charts a path forward to
safeguarding students’ free speech rights in K-12 schools.
A. Free Speech Shortfalls: A Call for Change
The judicial decisions in Hazelwood, Fraser, and Morse do not
provide any constitutional protections to students participating in national
anthem protests. In all three cases, the Supreme Court carved out narrow
exceptions that permit school authorities to censor student speech, none of
which are applicable to the type of symbolic speech at issue in national
anthem protests.232 For instance, the school-sponsored expressive activity
addressed in Hazelwood is distinct from the extra-curricular sporting
events at issue in national anthem protests. First, the school-sponsored
activity in Hazelwood, a student newspaper, was part of the educational
curriculum233 whereas school athletic teams are not a part of the
curriculum. Second, the free speech at the center of the controversy in
Hazelwood occurred during the regular school day234 whereas high school
sporting events typically are held outside of the regular school hours,
thereby removing any threat of a material disruption to the school learning
environment.
Although some individuals may argue that extra-curricular school
athletic events are implicitly part of the educational curriculum—and thus
should be analyzed under the aforementioned free speech jurisprudence—
because they are designed to teach values like teamwork, conflict
management skills, and responsibility, those sentiments should be rejected
adamantly. Student participation in extra-curricular activities, such as
football, are voluntary activities in which students do not receive academic
credit for participation and thus are outside the scope of Hazelwood.
Furthermore, the performance of students who play on school-sponsored
athletic teams are not part of the educational curriculum because their
athletic performance is not used to evaluate academic achievement.
Similarly, the Fraser standard is not applicable to national anthem protests
because its narrow rule only permits school authorities to censor lewd and
indecent speech.235 The symbolic speech students are conveying by
kneeling during the national anthem is not lewd or indecent but rather
political speech intended to communicate the need to address police
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See Blad, supra note 19; see also discussion supra Part I.B.
See discussion supra Part I.B.; Blad, supra note 19.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
Id. at 262–65.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
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brutality against black Americans. Likewise, the Morse standard, which
established that school authorities may regulate student speech that
promotes illegal drug use during school-sponsored events, is distinct from
the symbolic speech expressed in national anthem protests because the
message is intended to speak out against police brutality, not promote
illegal drug use.
The speech-protective standard espoused in Tinker serves as a catchall for regulating students’ free speech rights in schools because the scope
of First Amendment protections in Morse, Frazer, and Hazelwood are so
limited.236 Despite Tinker’s speech-protective rhetoric, however, it too
falls short of adequately safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights in
schools. First, the Material Disruption Standard, as interpreted by the
lower courts, gives too much deference to school authorities.237 Scholars
like Professor Andrew Miller argue that school authorities have almost
unbridled discretion in regulating student speech.238 The expansive
deference given to school authorities is problematic, especially in the
context of national anthem protests, because it fails to shield students from
school authorities using their discretionary power to limit student speech
simply because they disagree with the content of the message. For
example, the principal of Lely High School in Naples, Florida mandated
that students stand during the national anthem or be removed from athletic
games.239 Similarly, students choosing to participate in national anthem
protests were suspended at Doherty High School in Worcester,
Massachusetts.240 Both instances demonstrate how affording school
authorities too much deference allows them to engage in viewpoint
discrimination, which is prohibited by the First Amendment.241 Thus, in
the context of national anthem protests, the Tinker standard serves as a
breeding ground for viewpoint discrimination because of the expansive
deference given to school authorities. Viewpoint discrimination undermines
236. Bernard James, Tinker in the Era of Judicial Deference: The Search for
Bad Faith, 81 UMKC L. REV. 601, 613 (2013).
237. Id. at 615.
238. Miller, supra note 95, at 626.
239. Blad, supra note 19.
240. Cindy Boren, High school rethinks decision to suspend player for national
anthem protest, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/early-lead/wp/2016/09/12/high-school-rethinks-decision-to-suspend-playerfor-national-anthem-protest/?utmterm=.f3829cb7a19e [https://perma.cc/M864-9Z
YA].
241. Viewpoint discrimination refers to the idea that state actors may not censor
speech based on its content or the viewpoint of the speaker. See Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
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one of the key purposes of the First Amendment, which is to promote a
marketplace of ideas.242
The school environment should be a quintessential marketplace of ideas
where students are trained on how to participate actively in democracy
through vast exposure to robust exchanges of ideas that challenge and
critique existing ideologies.243 This sentiment is captured in a prominent
educational theory—“The Open Classroom Model”—in which students
are introduced to objective conceptions of diverse perspectives and
theories that allow them to critique the validity of the various positions.244
According to this theory, the purpose of education is to equip students with
the skills, knowledge, and critical thinking skills to make informed
decisions and actively participate in democracy.245 This notion is
illustrated in the following quote from Tinker: “Students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses
to communicate.”246 Therefore, student national anthem protests to express
opposition to the treatment of black Americans in the United States,
particularly by police officers, contribute to the marketplace of ideas
regarding minority relations and critique existing practices. The students
like Kaepernick are exercising their constitutional right to participate
actively in public discourse and the free exchange of ideas. It is illogical
to acknowledge Kaepernick’s right to freedom of expression yet allow the
State to deny citizens-in-training—students—the same opportunity.
Because school sporting events are open to the general public, it is more
difficult for school officials to filter what types of political and social
messages students receive from spectators. Therefore, notions of equity
demand that students, like sporting event attendees, are permitted the same
constitutional freedoms to express themselves freely as long as they are
not infringing on the rights of others. Moreover, it is well established in
First Amendment jurisprudence that students are considered “persons”

242. Stephen C. Jacques, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the First
Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1945, 1949–50 (1997).
243. Keyishian v. Bd. Of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The classroom
is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.’” (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943))).
244. Deborah A. Churton-Hale, Tinker Goes to the Theater: Student First
Amendment Rights and High School Theatrical Productions in Seyfried v.
Walton, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 273 (1984).
245. Id.
246. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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under the Constitution both in an outside of school.247 Therefore, students
should be afforded the same level of constitutional protections as adults to
the greatest extent possible. As the Court stated in Tinker, “Students in
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They
are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as
they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.”248
Because democracy and free speech are inextricably linked, laws must
be developed that safeguard free speech rights in our nation’s public
schools. One scholar has supported this notion by stating that “[i]nstead of
offering them the government of ‘The Brave New World,’ young people
need help to empower themselves. It’s not enough for the coming
generation to know old ideas, they must be able to develop their own.”249
This goal can be accomplished only by prioritizing the preservation of
students’ free speech rights in K-12 schools and dismantling efforts to
stifle the free exchange of ideas. The vigilant protection of First
Amendment freedoms is nowhere more vital than our nation’s public
schools.250 For these reasons, the current Tinker standard needs to be
revamped to better protect students’ free speech rights.
B. Tinker-Spence Standard: A New Constitutional Standard for Free
Speech in K-12 Schools
The proposed new K-12 standard applies the full protections of the
Spence Test251 for student-initiated symbolic speech during non-academic,
school-sponsored events. The Spence case is part of numerous symbolic
speech cases that provide a framework for First Amendment freedom of
expression jurisprudence.252 Currently, the criterion established to
247. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are ‘Persons’ Under Our ConstitutionExcept When They Aren’t, supra note 75, at 1339.
248. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
249. The Brave New World of Fear: Public Education, supra note 16.
250. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
251. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974).
252. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989) (holding that the
defendant’s act of burning the American flag during a protest is expressive
conduct that is afforded First Amendment protections); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“[A]
narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’
. . . would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,
music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”); United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (holding that the Flag Burning Act
was subject to strict scrutiny and could not be upheld under the First Amendment).
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determine protected speech in Spence v. Washington is used exclusively
in the context of adult freedom of expression cases and is thus not
applicable to K-12 settings.253 The Spence Test, however, is a great starting
point for developing a new constitutional standard to ensure that students’
freedom of expression rights are protected in K-12 schools because it is
considered the seminal case in symbolic speech. In Spence, the defendant
displayed an upside-down flag with a peace symbol affixed on both sides
outside his apartment window in protest of the killings at Kent State
University and the invasion of Cambodia during the Vietnam War.254
Three police officers observed the flag and arrested the defendant for
violating the Washington Flag-Desecration Statute, which made it a
misdemeanor to place “any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing
or advertisement” upon the flag of the United States and to display such
flag in its superimposed state.255 At trial, the defendant argued that he used
black tape intentionally to affix the peace symbol to the flag so it could be
removed without damaging the flag.256 He asserted that because he did not
damage the flag, he was not in violation of the statute.257 Furthermore, the
defendant contended that the flag desecration statute was an impermissible
violation of his First Amendment rights because it was overbroad on its
face and, thus, invalid.258 The lower court rejected the defendant’s
253. Students in K-12 public schools do not receive the same constitutional
protections as adults, as evidenced by the Supreme Court decisions in Tinker,
Morse, Hazelwood and Fraser, which, collectively, govern students’ free speech
rights. Unlike the broad free speech rights established in Spence v. Washington
for adults, student free speech jurisprudence allows school administrators to limit
students’ First Amendment rights if the speech causes a material disruption or
meets one of the exceptions established by the court; see supra note 227. See
generally Colleen Creamer Fielkow, Bullies, Words, and Wounds: One State’s
Approach in Controlling Aggressive Expression Between Children, 46 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1057, 1074, 1077 (1997) (“In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has
determined that children receive less constitutional protection than adults . . . . the
Court has carved out other categories of expression from First Amendment
protection for student speech—modeled after the First Amendment doctrine as
applied to adults . . . . These categories are more easily invoked in the public
school setting than for adults since the school authorities have a lower
constitutional threshold to satisfy than a state attempting to curb adult
expression.”).
254. Spence, 418 U.S. at 406.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 408.
258. State v. Spence, 490 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1971), rev’d, 506 P.2d 293 (1973),
rev’d sub nom. Spence v. Washington., 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (“The instant case
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argument and sentenced him to jail and a fine for violating the statute.259
The defendant unsuccessfully appealed the trial court decision to the
Washington Supreme Court, which upheld the defendant’s conviction and
rejected any claims to free speech rights.260 The Washington Supreme
Court reasoned, “The statute does not purport to inhibit speech of any kind
whether actual or symbolic, printed or auditory; it merely says that one
cannot use the flag of the United States as the material upon which to print his
utterance.”261 This victory for the State of Washington, however, was short
lived.262 The Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court decision,
ruling in favor of the defendant.263
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court focused on ascertaining
whether the conduct “was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication
to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[].”264 To this end, the Court
for the first time attempted to define which symbolic acts are protected under
the First Amendment.265 Prior to the Spence case, there was pervasive
uncertainty among the lower courts regarding how to delineate which
symbolic acts are protected under the First Amendment.266 In response to
the split in the circuit courts, the Spence Court established that the
following criteria must be met for a determination that symbolic speech is
protected under the First Amendment: (1) the actor/speaker intends to
convey a particular message; and (2) it must be likely that those who
witness the activity will understand what the speaker intends to convey by
his or her behavior.267 These criteria, combined with the Tinker Material
Disruption Standard, serve as the guiding principles for the proposed new
constitutional standard for evaluating whether a student’s symbolic speech
is protected under the First Amendment.
Under the proposed Tinker-Spence Standard, student symbolic speech
qualifies for First Amendment protections if all of the following occur:
(1) The actor/speaker intends to convey a particular message;

illustrates overbreadth on the face of RCW 9.86.020(1) and (2), not only with
respect to the American flag itself, but also with respect to the items included in
the statutory definition of the flag.”).
259. Spence, 418 U.S. at 407 (1974).
260. Id. at 408.
261. Spence, 506 P.2d at 299.
262. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 408.
263. Id. at 412.
264. Spence, 506 P.2d at 797.
265. Spence, 418 U.S. at 409–10.
266. See McGoldrick, Jr., supra note 25, at 33.
267. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
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(2) Those who witness the activity likely understand what the
speaker intends to convey by his or her behavior;
(3) Symbolic speech does not interfere with the rights of others;
and
(4) Symbolic speech does not involve peer coercion of other
students to participate.
Applying the Tinker-Spence Standard to the student protests during
the national anthem, the symbolic speech communicated through kneeling
would be protected constitutionally because the student intends to convey
a message—stop police brutality against black American males—and
those who witness the symbolic conduct—individuals attending/watching
the sporting event—understand what the student intends to communicate
through his actions. The symbolic speech does not interfere with the legal
rights of other students or spectators attending the event. To the contrary,
national anthem protests are a form of symbolic speech that the First
Amendment encourages and was designed to protect.268 Whether school
authorities agree or disagree with the symbolic message being conveyed
through the national anthem protests is irrelevant. Adopting the TinkerSpence standard promotes a long-held tradition of promoting free speech
by encouraging the exchange of diverse ideas and perspectives. Lastly, as
long as the student conveying the symbolic message does not try to coerce
other students to participate, the conduct should be afforded the full
constitutional protections of the First Amendment. The last factor—the
symbolic speech does not involve peer coercion to participate—is important
because it protects students from being subjected to peer pressure to convey
a particular message, which, in the context of national anthem protests, is a
message in opposition to the mistreatment of black Americans. It is crucial
not only that we protect students’ constitutional rights to convey a message
through conduct but also safeguard non-participating students from being
coerced into communicating a particular message.
Additionally, the Tinker-Spence Standard should be adopted because
it accounts for the special characteristics of schools by requiring that
students’ symbolic speech not involve coercing peers into participation
nor interfere with the rights of others. One of the special characteristics of
K-12 schools is that they contain youths that are vulnerable to peer
pressure because of their developmental stage. The proposed new
constitutional standard safeguards students’ symbolic speech rights, such
as participating in national anthem protests, while protecting their peers
from being compelled to speak by participating in the protest. Just as

268. Wasserman, supra note 48, at 394.
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students should not be compelled by school authorities to stand for the
national anthem, which is a form of symbolic speech, their peers should
not be coerced into kneeling in protest for the national anthem.
The proposed Tinker-Spence standard also should be adopted because
it bridges the doctrinal gap between Tinker and Spence, thereby providing
stronger First Amendment protections for students’ symbolic speech. The
new standard protects students from school authorities using the court’s
deference to legitimize viewpoint discrimination, such as prohibiting
national anthem protests, by eliminating the application of Tinker’s
Material Disruption Standard to extra-curricular activities. One scholar
suggests addressing concerns about Tinker serving as a conduit for
viewpoint discrimination by modifying Tinker’s existing framework to
deter viewpoint discrimination.269 Specifically, the scholar contends that
speech restrictions under Tinker should be tailored narrowly to achieve a
legitimate governmental purpose to reduce the risk of viewpoint
discrimination.270 The Tinker-Spence test is a better solution, however,
because it addresses the need to minimize the deference given to school
authorities to regulate student speech. Under the proposed Tinker-Spence
standard, whether the government has a legitimate interest in censoring
student symbolic speech is irrelevant. Furthermore, Tinker’s Material
Disruption Standard never should have applied to non-curricular school
activities because it minimizes students’ free speech protections.271 Any
standard governing free speech rights in schools should balance students’
rights and the ability of school authorities to maintain an environment
conducive to learning. This proposed standard accomplishes that goal.
In addition to addressing all of the aforementioned shortfalls in
Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard, the proposed new standard
provides students with the full protections of the Spence Standard that is
applied in adult contexts. Under this new standard, students are afforded
the same constitutional protections as Kaepernick, as long as the students’
symbolic expression does not interfere with the rights of others or involve
peer coercion. Because students are considered “persons” under the
Constitution,272 courts should strive to afford them with the same free
269. See John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L.
Rev. 569, 569 (2009).
270. Id. at 623.
271. Brownstein, supra note 183, at 742–43; see also Walter E. Forehand,
Constitutional Law-Tinkering with Tinker: Academic Freedom in the Public
Schools-Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988), 16 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 159, 170 (1988).
272. See Lomonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students Are ‘Persons’ Under Our
Constitution-Except When They Aren’t, supra note 75, at 1339.
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speech protections to the greatest extent possible. The proposed TinkerSpence standard accomplishes this goal.
C. Limitations of Proposed Tinker-Spence Standard
Despite the laudable intentions behind the endorsement of this new
constitutional standard, it is important to acknowledge the potential
limitations and negative outcomes that may result from the adoption of
this standard. First, there is a potential negative economic effect on K-12
schools. Many sports spectators may take the stance that they are
purchasing a ticket to view the game and not a political protest.273 Because
kneeling during the national anthem is considered disrespectful to the
military, allowing students to engage in this type of symbolic conduct may
result in boycotts and loss of sponsorships.274 Second, affording studentathletes the full constitutional protection to engage in social protests
during the national anthem also may increase the likelihood of violence at
school sporting events because of hostile responses from those in
opposition to symbolic acts. For example, members of the Beaumont
Bears little league team were subjected to racial slurs and death threats for
kneeling during the national anthem at a football game.275 Therefore,
safeguarding student rights to engage in social protests during the national
anthem, even if it causes a material disruption, may result in increased
costs to schools for additional security.
Despite the possibility of material disruptions, the preservation of First
Amendment rights is so integral to the fabric of our nation that democracy
demands that these rights are not limited simply to appease the sentiments
of those in opposition. Embracing diverse viewpoints and perspectives is
one of the foundational elements of democracy. Therefore, we must
protect those rights fervently. Lastly, although the proposed standard
prohibits any form of peer coercion to communicate a particular message,
peer pressure and K-12 schooling are inextricably linked.276 It is well
established in social science literature that peer groups have a tremendous
273. McGinnis, supra note 51.
274. Id.
275. Shaun King, KING: After taking a knee, young boys saw their football
coach suspended then their whole season canceled, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 17,
2016, 1:19 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/king-young-footballteam-season-canceled-knee-article-1.2833792 [https://perma.cc/USH8-ZJ56].
276. Marcie Samartino, Schools and Youth TALK BACK do Schools Say Yes
to Peer Pressure, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1994, at 1, 2 (“[S]chools do enough to help
people deal with peer pressure because the schools cannot change the way people
are, and no matter what, there will always be peer pressure.”).
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influence on students’ attitudes and behaviors.277 Despite these limitations,
the benefits of the Spence-Tinker standard supersede any disadvantages.
CONCLUSION
Public schools play the most critical role in preparing youth for
democratic participation and citizenship.278 One of the goals of public
education is to encourage civic participation by imparting students with the
skills, knowledge, and fundamental values necessary for the preservation of
our democratic system.279 At the heart of these goals is providing students
with the opportunity to engage in political involvement by participating in
simulations of democratic structures and processes, such as social protests.280
Therefore, it is crucial to implement constitutional safeguards through the
adoption of the Tinker-Spence standard to shield students from violations of
their constitutional freedom of expression rights and to help preserve civic
education in K-12 schools. Ideally, schools should mirror the society in
which students live to adequately prepare the youth for adulthood. How can
students be expected to engage actively as citizens without the opportunity
to practice their civic and political skills? The Tinker-Spence standard
ensures that the creed set forth by the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines281 is
honored—that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse door. One of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is
to protect individuals from having their rights infringed upon by private and
public citizens.282 To deny children the same constitutional rights afforded

277. Kimberly A. Maxwell, Friends: The Role of Peer Influence Across
Adolescent Risk Behaviors, J. OF YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 267, 268 (“To explain
how peer influence and friendship selection affect adolescent behavior, theory
posits that peer pressure exists as the mutual effect of close friends and that the
type of friendship determines the degree of influence.”).
278. MCCORMICK FOUND., CIVIC BLUEPRINT FOR ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOLS 21
(2003), http://documents.mccormickfoundation.org/PDF/IL-Civic-Blueprint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5296-B89W].
279. Id. at 22.
280. Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational
Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1278 (2000).
281. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 503 (1969).
282. Governmental control of actions or speech of public officers or
employees in respect of matters outside the actual performance of their duties. C.
R. McCorkle, Governmental control of actions or speech of public officers or
employees in respect of matters outside the actual performance of their duties,
163 A.L.R. 1358 (1946).
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to adults goes against the spirit and purpose of the Constitution. As one
scholar correctly noted,
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom--this kind of openness--that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society.283
Society must be relentless in its fight to protect the freedom of expression
rights of future citizens. Democracy depends upon it.

283. Id. at 508–09.

